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This thesis is a study of the Alliance for Progress
and an attempt to determine its place in the national se-
curity policy of the United States. The threat to United
States security which could arise in the hemisphere are
postulated, and a number of policy objectives for the area
are set forth. Then the Alliance is studied as a method of
meeting th^s« threats and helping to achieve these objec-
tives.
After first considering the relevance of economic
assistance as a tool of foreign policy, the early chapters
are concerned with identifying the threats and establishing
the objectives of U. S. hemisphere policy. The basic eco-
nomic and social problems of Latin America are identified
and analyzed for their significance in relation to the
security of the United States. In addition, some of the
highlights of inter-American cooperation are traced in a
brief background of events leading up to the Alliance.
The middle portion of the thesis is devoted to the
nature -:ture of the Alliance, how the various par-
ticipating organs and agencies are organized, and the
objectives and programs of the Alliance. These factors,
including the United States organization for carrying out




3which they contribute to or detract from the achievement of
our national aims.
Finally, some of the results of the programs, politi-
cal, economic, and social, are observed and related to the
basic problems in the hemisphere and to the tasks remaining
in an attempt to see how the Alliance can affect political
decisions of the present and future. The author concludes
that the Alliance can strengthen the Organization of American
States and help to shift some peace-keeping responsibilities
to that organization, as well as serving as an instrument to
persuade or coerce Latin American governments or political
groups to take actions or positions favorable to the Unitea
States interests.
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This thesis is a study of the Alliance for Progress
as an asset to the national security of the United States.
The writer has attempted to establish the relationship be-
tween existing conditions and security threats, and between
future possibilities and our national aims* The ways in
which the Alliance does or could contribute to our national
interest in the case of Latin America is then considered*
The research started in late 1963 and continued until
the end of August, 1964* Many important events have occurred
since then which are not included herein* Two exceptions
were made: the outcome of the presidential election in
Chile, and the rupture of relations with Cuba by Uruguay*
These events were significant for arguments presented in
this work, and the news was available before the last three
chapters were written, so they were included*
The writer was fortunate to have h^en able to attend
a Symposium on Latin America at the Center for Strategic
Studies at Georgetown University in the summer of 1964*
Thus, he had an opportunity to compare a number of Latin
American viewpoints and some aspects of American security
policy which otherwise might have escaped him* The partici-
pants and many persons in various government departments who
also provided facts and ideas did not wish to be quoted; so
all information gained from sources of this nature has been
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incorporated in the body of the thesis without individual
credit.
The writer is grateful to many people who helped in
one way or another* Among the faculty members of The
American University, Dr. Durwerd V, Sandifer and Dr. Harold
£• Davis were foremost in arousing his interest in this
subject and contributing to whatever intellectual value
there may be in the thesis. He is indebted to both of these
professors for stimulating his thoughts and providing help-
ful guidance during the studies which led to this work. Dr.
Charles 0. Lerche, Jr. also encouraged him; William C.
Cromwell was an indispensable source of guidance, humor, and
assistance.
The author is particularly indebted to his wife who
read and reread, typed and retyped, and without whose
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The Alliance for Progress is a relatively new ap-
proach to United states relations with Latin America. Many
aspects of the Alliance are not novel; but, as a vast coop-
erative effort to modernize an entire continent and more, it
is a formidable challenge* President John F. Kennedy said:
We propose to complete the revolution of the Americas,
to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a
suitable standard of living and all men can live out
their lives in dignity and in freedom*
*
The Alliance is an attempt to accelerate economic
development and increase social justice in Latin America.
The task is monumental and the commitment of the United
States is very great. Why does the United States Government
consider that such a heavy commitment to this effort is re-
quired. Many reasons have been advanced over the past few
years. Somewhere between the extremes of pure philanthropy
and unwavering anti-Communism there is a spectrum of reasons
for sponsoring a foreign aid program of this magnitude*
There has been no scarcity of justifications enunciated in
relation to fighting communism* This has apparently helped
to obtain authorization and appropriations in Congress*
John F* Kennedy, President Kennedy Speaks on the
Alliance for Progress < Washington: AID, 1962), p.T.**
Address at White House reception for Latin American diplo-
mats on March 13, 1961*
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Although it has been said that "foreign aid would be impel-
2ling were there no Sino-Soviet bloc," nevertheless, the
interests of the United States are expressed in much more
general terns if communism is not considered a factor*
The purpose of this paper is to determine our na-
tional interest in this area and to see what the principal
security objectives are and how they can be served by the
Alliance* The security of the United States has long been
recognized as having a close relationship with the security
of the western Hemisphere* The Monroe Doctrine shows our
early concern for this problem) the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio Treaty) is a more recent
manifestation* Opinions have varied over the years concern-
ing the extent to which our security actually was dependent
upon conditions in the rest of the hemisphere* Fidel Castro
has contributed to a fairly widespread acceptance of the
idea that our interest is bound up closely in the affairs of
Latin America* At a press conference on February 7, 1963,
President Kennedy called latin America "the most critical
area in the world today*"
In the early days of the United Nations, the Latin
Americans were more interested In a strong regional organi-
sation than we were* The hostility and expansionism of the
2
Dean Rusk, "Charting a New Course in Foreign Aid,"
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3Soviet Union caused the United States to shift the emphasis
back to regional security arrangements, and, in the last few
years, events have borne out the fact that there is a defi-
nite security problem in the Western Hemisphere* This
problem has several aspects. However, the threat of inter-
national communism has become the dominant concern; and
internal political unrest and upheavals are viewed in the
light of their relationship to the communist threat*
In the past year, a possibility of somewhat less
tense relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States has been noted* tfhile this, by no means, allows a
relaxation of our defense posture, it does afford an oppor-
tunity to review our long-range interests and goals as they
might exist without a constant threat of general war* The
extent of subversion, "wars of liberation, r and other such
activities cannot be forecast accurately at this time; but
we can attempt to visualise the Alliance for Progress in a
slightly different context than that of the past few years*
With or without the threat of imminent nuclear holo-
caust, the Alliance stands as an attempt to face and over-
come the problems which might lead to highly unfavorable
political results in Latin America*
The relevance of foreign aid as a tool of foreign
policy will be our first consideration* Then social, eco-
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4analyzed for their significance in relation to the security
of the United States* Next to be considered will be the
nature and structure of the Alliance and how these factors
and the objectives and programs of the Alliance contribute
to or detract from the achievement of national aims*
Finally, some of the results of the programs, political as
well as economic and social, will be observed and related to
the basic problems and the tasks remaining in the hope that
we can relate the Alliance to political decisions of the
present and the future in the light of our security needs.
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CHAPTER II
FOREIGN AID AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The question of the use of foreign aid as an instru-
ct of foreign policy is one on which many books have been
written. It is obviously too large a subject to be settled
here, but it seems worthwhile, indeed necessary, to estab-
lish the position of the united States in this regard* In
this chapter, the officially stated position of the United
States Government and the avowed goals of the foreign aid
program will be reviewed* The Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 provides a convenient starting point* Then, an en-
deavor will be made to translate the euphemistically-expressed
objectives into terms of self-interest and national security*
Finally, the overall aid strategy to the Americas will be
related*
The purely humanitarian arguments for foreign aid
cannot be completely ignored, but this writer will consider
them only as parts of a more broadly based argument* The
idea that foreign economic assistance is a complete waste
and should be abandoned is not now widely enough held to
warrant much attention* Only one of the respondents to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's request for views from
retired Foreign Service Officers expressed this negative
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6viewpoint. Proposals which emanated from the Center for
International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology aay be more properly considered as a basis for argu-
it. A key point of controversy in this point of view,
'times referred to as the "tfillikan-Rostow school of
thought , " is that assistance should promote "a steady, self-
sustaining rate of growth" without "narrowly political or
2
military objectives," The thesis that the Government
should participate in long-term economic development pro-
grams in underdeveloped areas as a means of "developing
viable, energetic, and confident democratic societies" has
bean widely accepted and is evident in the statements of
Government spokesmen. However, any neglect of immediate
political and military objectives is open to attack, and
none of the Kennedy-Johnson aid programs have ignored these
short-term objectives*
United States Congress, Senate, United States foreign
Policy , Stm. Doc. Ho, 24, 87» Cong., lst~Sess7 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1410.
Kax tm Killikan and Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal ; Key
to an affective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper brothers,
T?577, p. 53.
* *
Kr. Rostow *s position as Chairman of the Policy
Planning Council in the Department of State may be consid-
ered as either a cause or effect, but, in any event, cer-
tainly has some significance in these statements of policy.
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7A number of studies »»av« agreed with the need for
foreign aid but differed concerning the priorities, the
amounts, the terms, the relative importance of military aid,
and other policy considerations* A very large proportion of
the criticism of aid programs has been directed at their
personnel and administration* After his work for the Draper
Committee, Arnold Wolfers provided an excellent, concise
A
analysis of the basic policy problem* The third interim
report of the Draper Committee provided many recommendations
5for more effective economic aid programs*
I. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT 0? 1961
Senator John P* Kennedy had been one of the critics
of the Eisenhower aid programs; and, after assuming the
Presidency, he embarked upon a large-scale reorganisation*
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 brought most of the eco-
nomic aid activities under the direction of a new organisa-
tion, the Agency for International Development (AID). The
Secretary of State was given statutory responsibility for
the supervision and general direction of all foreign
t
4
"Military or Economic Aid: Questions of iriorlty,
in Walter F* Hahn and John C. Meff (eds*), American Strategy

















assistance programs, and the inlstrator was placed
under the Secretary of Jtate with the equivalent rank of
Undersecretary* The Agency was a successor to the inter-
national Cooperation Administration and also absorbed the
Development Loan Fund and the overseas activities of the
Food for Peace program.
The recommendations of the Draper Committee, the
Jackson Subcommittee, and the Presidential Task Force on
Foreign Economic Assistance headed by Henry R. Laboulss*
could be seen in the reorganisation. The new Foreign Assist-
ance Program contained no revolutionary changes. In large
part, it merely provided answers to the peripheral crit -
clsms concerning administration and management. However,
there was also ai attempt to confront the deeper problems of
objectives and priorities. The importance of long-range
economic development programs was recognised, along with the
necessity for the allocation of public funds for development
loans. The Foreign Assistance Act reflected the balancing
of resources between programs designed to serve short-term
and long-term objectives according to the priorities set up
by the new administration and the Congress.
United States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing and Operations to the Committee
on Government Operations, Henry M. Jackson, Chairman.
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II. LQNG-RANG2 GOALS
Congress declared that it was its purpose to help
make an historic demonstration that economic growth and
political democracy could go hand-in-hand to the end that an
enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations
might reduce world tensions and insecurity. For the first
time, a five-year program of long-term development lending
was authorised. Although these loans would be subject to
the annual appropriations* battle, it was, nevertheless, an
important step toward continuity and a sense of confidence
in development projects. Development grants, technical
assistance, investment guarantees, investment surveys,
Cooley loans, and supporting assistance and military aid all
were included. Military aid was reduced somewhat, and
development loan appropriations jumped to over one billion
dollars.
This increased emphasis on long-range economic develop-
ment reflected the Kennedy Administration *s view that the
national interest of the United States would be served by
contributing to the self-sustaining economic growth of the
developing nations. Under this concept of harmonised inter-
ests, temporary setbacks and misunderstandings are unimpor-
tant because the United States wants the same things for the
less-developed states that they want for themselves. While
keeping its powder dry and maintaining an adequate "strategic
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10
assistance" program to counter communist threats and provide
immediate or short-run gains, the United States is to devote
a considerable part of its effort to encouraging those
development efforts which—hopefully—will lead to a whole
array of new, prosperous, stable, free nations.
The idealistic view of the future in which the devel-
oping nations naturally evolve into stable, peaceful, demo-
cratic societies is only a part of the problem. It is a
position too open to attack by realists on the grounds that
the pr v. ->nt and the near future hold dangers too critical to
allow resources to be diverted to such long-range goals.
Therefore, the foreign aid program contains what might be
termed a "mix of weapons'1 designed for different objectives.
III. SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES
What are these objectives? The long-range objectives
of helping to develop independent, self-supporting nations
which have made progress under free institutions have been
discussed. This is in the national interest: a part of the
liberal tradition of the nation and an aspect of United
States national security of the future. Another objective
is to support the governments and help establish stability
in countries that are friendly or, at least, not allied with
the enemies of the United States. Also, the United States
needs to keep open trade relations and routes in order to
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In addition, a certain number of overseas bases and agree-
ments to facilitate military operations, such as the use of
ports and other transportation and communication facilities,
are required. These objectives would be valid even if there
were no such thing as communism*
Other objectives include:
1* Keeping large military forces in being around the
Communist periphery;
2. Obtaining and maintaining a presence in the un-
committed nations; gaining some influence and
preventing the Communists from doing so or, at
least, reducing their influence;
3* winning the friendships of uncommitted nations
and, in some cases, establishing alliances.
These objectives are rather directly related to the Communist
threat and are subject to review from time to time because
of the possible contradictions between them and some of the
longer-range goals. However, at the present time, they
retain a high degree of relevance, and an important part of
the United States aid program is directed toward these aims.
The Alliance for Progress was established at the same
time as the rest of the Kennedy foreign aid program, but the
Alliance has been somewhat divorced from the rest of the
Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs by the Administration.
Ignoring the special aspects or characteristics of the Alli-
ance for a moment, let us just see whether the above security
objectives fit the situation in Latin America.
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IV. RELEVAMCE OF OBJECTIVES III LATIN AMERICA
The desirability of independent, democratic, prosper-
ous neighbors is obvious, as are the advantages of stable
governments friendly to the United States. The need to keep
open trade relations with Latin America is at least equally
as great as with the rest of the developing nations. De-
spite the advent of guided missiles and other technological
advances, the more prosaic forms of warfare cannot be ig-
nored. Anti-submarine warfare, logistic needs, and the
defense of the Panama Canal will require overflight and
landing rights, perhaps bases, and even active assistance in
the event of certain types of hostilities. The need of the
United States to maintain a presence in Latin America and to
limit Communist influence is very obvious, finally, there
are in existence a Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and a
regional security system, and it is advantageous to the
United states to keep them effective. Therefore, the only
objective not applicable to Latin America is the need for
large military forces to confront the Communist land forces.
There ace f then, many security objectives which can
be considered as reasons for economic assistance to Latin
America. Other considerations will also be noted, but the
author will concentrate on the avowed aims of the Alliance
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CHAPTER III
THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
The objectives of American assistance programs have
just been defined, and their relevance to Latin America
noted. Now it might be appropriate also to consider the
problem of possible threats to United States security in the
hemisphere.
I. SECURITY THREATS
There are five different categories which deserve
attention* The threat of overt aggression by a power from
outside the hemisphere is the historical problem, and one
for which the nations of America have previously success-
fully mobilized. The aggression by one or more American
nation on a neighbor is another old problem. Both of these
kinds of threat are specifically provided for in the inter
-
American security system under the Rio Treaty. Domestic
unrest and revolutions by indigenous movements provide a
third type of problem; while subversive activities, revolu-
tions and government takeovers inspired, conducted, financed
or taken advantage of by international communist forces are
the fourth and most threatening type at the present time. A
fifth type would be the establishment of a stable government
which was unfriendly to the United States but could not be
classified in one of the other categories.
. tml • * :
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The first two categories above may be considered
direct aggression. They are unanimously condemned through-
out the hemisphere, and the inter-American system is pre-
pared to deal with them* Essentially, the United States is
prepared to provide the military force to repel invasions,
and the other countries are prepared to sanction its action
and provide moral and perhaps physical support as required.
The other three categories create an entirely different
problem. Governments unfriendly to the United States are
obviously not looked upon with any great disfavor in Latin
America, while insurrection and revolution are widely felt
by the Latins to be domestic matters of no concern to the
United States. This has been a problem throughout this
century. However, since we have repudiated the right to
intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American nations,
the problem has become one of attempting to prevent the
problems from arising, or encouraging multilateral interven-
tion. Both of these alternatives are inherently very diffi-
cult to accomplish.
II. PROBLEMS OF TAKING ACTION
In 1954, the Arbens regime in Guatemala demonstrated
the ability of communism to exert control over a government
in this hemisphere. This problem was solved rather effi-
ciently without OAS action and without open intervention by
~ <
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the United States* A number of other problems cropped up in
the next few years, some of which were settled by the GAS,
the United States practicing nonintervention* Then Castro
"liberated" Cuba* He was a popular hero in Latin America;
and, as his stock fell in the United States, it rose south
of the border* The United States was accused of supporting
right-wing dictatorships and op- ing popular governments*
The two Meetings of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in San
Jose, Costa Rica, in August, 1960, were indicative of the
Latin American orientation* The Ministers voted for a
strong resolution, including sanctions against the Trujillo
regime in the Dominican Republic; but only a mild resolution,
condemning intervention by an extra-continental power, was
passed in the case of Cuba, which was not even mentioned by
name in the resolution* The support for Castro diminished
enough to enable his exclusion from participating in the GAS
in 1962, but communist influence or activity is still evi-
dent in many places, such as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and
Venezuela* Several undemocratic regimes frustrate the cause
of freedom in other countries, most notably, perhaps, in
Haiti*
The Alliance for Progress is the latest, the most
dynamic, and the most far-reaching of the methods which have
been initiated to deal with this problem* It is an attack
on the underlying causes of unrest, a bold attempt to win
Iniw <* *q«»**« Mod » ,** 9-2011 10 m«m» * :*txw ,,nj m
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the people of Latin America to the cause of freedom by pro-
moting vast economic and social progress under peaceful
rather than violent circumstances.
By contributing to the elimination or reduction of
the poverty, the social and political contradictions and in-
justice which fan the flames of revolution, the TTnited
States faces the indirect security threats with the weapons
of peace; it seeks its objectives within the accepted rules
of the hemisphere* The United States overall policy is to
keep the Latin American governments and peoples firmly asso-
ciated with it and the Western world* Secretary of State
Dean Rusk said:
The wave of the future is the peaceful, democratic
revolution symbolised for the Americas in the Alli-
ance for Progress—the revolution which will bring
change without chaos, development without dictator-
ship and hope without hatred
•
i
III. ECONOMIC AMD SOCIAL PROBLEMS
IN LATIN AMERICA
The problems of Latin America are almost stereotyped
in the American mind, but it is necessary to review them
briefly in order to relate them to security problems and to
the Alliance. The latifundia of colonial times remain today
Ernest K. Lindley (ed.), The winds of Freedom (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1963), pp. 133-134."" "Gaioted from a speech by












to * great extent, although this varies considerably in dif-
ferent countries* In the earlier days of independence,
social and economic mobility was extremely limited. The
middle class was very small and the vast majority of the
people lived in abject poverty. Economic power was concen-
trated in the hands of an aristocracy* The military and the
church shared political power with the aristocracy and helped
resist change* Foreign investors had to ally themselves
with the dominant groups and became known as another element
of reaction* Serious physical obstacles to communication
and transportation in many cases also hindered progress*
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the impact
of the industrial revolution began to be felt intensively in
Latin America* The agricultural products and mineral re-
sources of the area were needed by the more industrialized
nations, and the foreign traders, investors, and immigrants
brought the technological advances of Western Europe and the
United States to Latin America* After World War I, the
larger countries began a rapid increase in industrialization,
and the rest of the countries attempted to build some indus-
try* Under the stimulus of industrialization, urbanization
and immigration, the population increased rapidly*
The increased wealth of the twentieth century did
little to improve the plight of the masses* However, between











groups in the rapidly growing urban centers did manage to
exert some pressure on the entrenched conservative elite.
The change front a predominantly rural and agricultural
economy to one that was increasingly urban and industrial
brought about a great social upheaval. The industrialists
led the first real challenge to the old order. The middle
groups and labor gained political power but found cleavages
between their Interests almost as great as those with the
old oligarchies. Whether brought about by violent revolu-
tion or less drastic measures, change came to most of Latin
America. However, stability did not necessarily accompany
the change. The new ruling groupswere normally in favor of
reform, but they often used highly undemocratic methods to
stay in power and carry out their reforms.
Host of the basic problems remained. Illiteracy was
high, vast numbers of people were essentially outside of the
economy, most of the countries depended on a few basic agri-
cultural exports for most of their foreign exchange; they
just did not qualify as modern, advanced states. Although
the per capita increase in gross national product rose
sharply after World War II, the average growth rate from
1950 to 1961 was about 1.4 per cent, and the 1962 average
was 266 dollars per capita, compared with the United states








2figure of about 2,820 dollars par capita* Each country is
somewhat different, but, in general, a social revolution is
just below the surface in touch of Latin America. A peace-
ful revolution is proposed by the Alliance*
IV. FROM TH£ GOOD NEIGHBOR TO THE ALLIANCE
We have seen the conditions in Latin America which
make necessary some form of ac lerated development program.
Now we will trace briefly some of the highlit its of the
growth of inter-American cooperation since the early days of
the "Good Neighbor Policy.
A movement called "Fan Americanism" grew in a rather
sporadic manner for more than a century, i resident Franklin
D. Roosevelt gave a new dynamism to this idea of hemispheric
solidarity by proclaiming the Good Neighbor Policy and re-
nouncing unilateral intervention. At the Special Conference
for the Maintenance of Peace held at Buenos Aires in 1936,
agreements were reached which provided for consultation
among the American Republics in the event of intervention or
threats to the peace. The Declaration of Lima, signed in
2AID, Latin America : Trends in Production and Trade
(Washington, 1963), pp. 14 and 19.
3Dr m Milton S. Eisenhower states, "there is absolutely
no doubt in my mind that revolution is inevitable in Latin
America," The wine Is Bitter (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963),
p. xi.
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1938, strengthened the basis for consultation and readied
the inter-American system for the cooperative measures soon
to be occasioned by the war. A series of pacts had already
been signed providing for peaceful settlement of disputes
among American states*
The need for consultation was soon obvious* As the
war spread across Europe, the first Meetings of Consultation
of Foreign Ministers were held in Panama in September, 1939,
and in Havana in July, 1940* The threat of involvement in
war brought cooperation in the hemisphere to a new high*
Among the steps taken were the formation of the Financial
and Economic Advisory Committee and the Inter-American
Development Commission* Military and economic cooperation
was stepped up to protect the hemisphere*
After Peaxl Harbor, a Third Meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters was held in January, 1942, and the remainder of the
machinery was set up for cooperation in the defense of the
html sphere* The Inter-American Defense Board and the Emer-
gency Committee for Political Defense were formed so that
military coordination and cooperative efforts against subver-
sive activities were 4ded to the already existing bodies
for economic cooperation* The United States furnished most
of the military strength and equipment, but the Latin Ameri-
cans provided bases of great strategic value, manpower, and,
very importantly, the raw materials which were so necessary
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for the prosecution of the war effort by the United States.
An almost closed economic system grew out of the effects of
the war on trade and the critical newi of the United States
for Latin American products. Quotas and price controls were
put in effect and a greatly expanded production of strategic
materials was built up* The United States poured money into
Latin America, and a substantial amount was devoted to de-
velopment of the infrastructure and resources of lasting
4
significance.
As the tide of war shifted against the Axis, hemi-
spheric cooperation became less critical to the war effort
and was of less concern to the United States. We shifted to
global rather than hemispheric horizons. The special Con-
ference on Problems of War and Peace, held at Mexico City in
early 1945, produced little in the way of concrete programs
for the transition to peace, but the general agreements
reached there led to the Rio Treaty and the Organisation of
American States. The existing pattern of collective se-
curity through consultation was institutionalised in the
1947 Rio Treaty, while the Inter-American regional organiza-
tion was formalized in 1948 in the Charter of Bogota,
4A concise account of wartime economic cooperation is
given in J. Lloyd Kecham, The United States and Inter-Amerlean
Security t 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1961), Chapter VTII. Arthur Whitaker notes the developmental
significance of wartime aid in The United States and South
America , the Northern Republics (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press , 1948).
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providing for political, economic and cultural cooperation
in very general terns. The Latin Americans wanted and ex-
pected extensive cooperative efforts for economic develop-
ment but were unable to get the United States even to parti-
cipate in an Inter-American Economic Conference* Despite
impressive resolutions and general statements at the general
conferences at Mexico City in 1945, Bogota in 1946, and
Caracas in 1954, concrete development programs of any great
scope could not be agreed upon* American policy was mainly
concerned with maintaining maximum tranquillity in Latin
America—a conservative policy* An important segment of
Latin American thought was anything but conservative*
In 1958, the economic policy of the United States
Government toward Latin America began to shift closer to the
nascent consensus of Latin American leaders* General agree-
ment was developing in Latin America as a result, to a large
extent, of the valuable work of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America, led by the able Or* Raul
Prebisch of Argentina* The Latin American hopes were pre-
sented effectively in August, 1956, by President Juscelino
John C. Oreier, The Organization of American States
and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1962),
p. 7TT"
Or. Prebisch has often opposed U*S* policies and is
a rather controversial figure* However, outstanding work was
accomplished by ECLA under his leadership, and this writer
has accepted the more favorable impression of Prebisch which
many observers endorse* Ibid., p. 61.
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Kubitschot of Brazil in his proposed "Operation Pan
America." The ominous signs of an economic crisis, the
threat of political instability and communism, and the hos-
tile reception accorded Vice President Richard Nixon helped
to swing United States support toward more government par-
ticipation in Latin American economic and social development*
An informal meeting of Foreign Ministers was held in
Washington in September, 1958, which recommended forming a
special committee of the CAS Council to formulate new meas-
ures for economic cooperation within the OAS* Another
recommendation called for the establishment of an inter-
American development institution* The Council of the OAS
Immediately formed the "Committee of Twenty-One" and the
Sconomic and Social Council appointed a special committee to
set up the financial institution, the Inter-American develop-
ment Bank* The efforts of the Committee of Twenty-One led
to the signing, in 1960, of the Act of Bogota, making Opera-
tion Pan America the basis for a new program of social and
economic progress* This was a direct foc^rxmaex of the
Alliance for Progress* Also in 1960, the Inter-American
Sconomic and Social Council was reorganised to enable it to
contribute more effectively to development efforts, and the
Social Progress Trust Fund was set up by the United States
to be administered by the Inter-American Development Bank*
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and a National Planning Association study noted:
In the current year [1959], a number of steps have
been taken to give U.S. policy a less negative tone
and to demonstrate more convincingly the deep in-
terest of the United States in Latin America's wel-
fare and progress*'
The problems arising from the Castro revolution in Cuba were
also becoming more obvious and more vexing as the Eisenhower
years drew to a close*
As the Kennedy Administration began, old policies and
old institutions maintained some of their relevance to hemi-
spheric security in the military, political and jur ileal
areas, but a new approach was emerging in the area of eco-
Q
nomic aid* In his inaugural address, President John F.
Kennedy said:
To our sister republics south of our border, we offer
a special pledge - to convert our good words into
good deeds - in a new alliance for progress - to as-
sist free men and free governments in casting off the
chains of poverty*
Then, on March 13, 1961, before a group of Latin American
diplomats at the White House, the President outlined Ha vast
new 10-year plan for the Americas, a plan to transform the
1960's into an historic decade of democratic progress* He
7United States Congress, Senate, United States - Latin
American Relations , Compilation of studies prepared under the
direction of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Document No*
125, 86a Cong*, 2d Sess* (Washington, I960), p* 408*
8It was unfortunate that a new approach to the Bay of
Pigs was not developed*
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all the people of the Hemisphere to join in a new
Alliance for Progress - Aliansa para el Progreso - a
vast cooperative effort , unparalleledTn magnitude
and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs
of the American people for homes, work and land,
health and schools » • • •*
The following day, the President asked Congress for their
full support for the program and, specifically, for an
authorization of $500 million as a first step. He warned
the Congress:
If we are unwilling to commit our resources and energy
to the task of social progress and economic develop*
ment—then we face a grave and imminent danger that
desperate peoples will turn to communism or other forms
of tyranny as their only hope for change* 10
The new policy not only had a name, but it had been clearly
related to the national interest and security of the United
States. The Alliance was proposed as a cooperative multi-
lateral effort of all the American republics, and a special
ministerial level meeting of the Inter-American economic and
Social Council was proposed by the President to begin the
massive planning and organisational work that would be re-
quired.
9John F. Kennedy, President Kennedy Speaks on the
Alliance for Progress ( Washington : AID, 1§62 ) , p. T7
10Ibid.« p. 29.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MULTILATERAL BASES OP THE ALLIANCE
A special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council was held at Funta del Este, Uruguay, in
August, 1961 , to put the Alliance for Progress into action.
A preponderance of the governments of the American countries
had finally come to accept a diagnosis of the problems of
economic and social progress which corresponded closely with
the real problems of Latin America* At last, they were pre-
pared to reach a general agreement on the nature and ex ent
of the cooperation and the measures that would be needed to
solve these problems* As a result, the representatives were
able to proclaim the Declaration of the Peoples of America
**** tne Charter of Punts del Este, establishing the Alliance
for Progress as a cooperative venture of the American
republics
•
I* THE CHARTER OP PUNTA DEL ESTE
The charter calls for enlisting the full energies of
the peoples and governments of the American republics in a
great cooperative effort to accelerate the economic and
social development of Latin America* Specific as well as
general goals and objectives are set forth* The charter
calls for a minimum average of two and one-half per cent per
capita rate of economic growth to provide for self-sustaining
I.
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development and a more equitable distribution of income to
make the benefits of economic progress available to all citi-
zens. Diversification of national economic structures and an
accelerated process of industrialization are called for, as
is the maintenance of stable currency and price levels, im-
proved balance of foreign trade and increased economic inte-
gration, possibly a Latin American common market* Additional
goals include an increased level of agricultural produc-
tivity, improved storage, marketing and transportation
facilities, comprehensive agrarian reform, and increased
credit and technical assistance for the man who works the
land* Social goals include greatly expanded educational
facilities and opportunities, improved nutrition and health,
increased public service and low-cost housing* Specific
objectives in this area include providing access to six
years of education to every school-age child and increasing
life expectancy by at least five years*
All the Latin American nations except Cuba pledged
themselves to a drastic revision of their institutions,
their tax systems, their agricultural practices and tradi-
tions, and to a process of sound planning in order to direct
I an American Union, Alliance for Progress , ctricial
Documents emanating from the Special Meeting of the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council at the Ministerial
Level held in Punta del £ste, Uruguay, August, 1961 (Wash-
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their energies and resources toward economic and social
progress within the processes and principles of representa-
tive democracy* They acknowledged that the task could only
be accomplished through the self-help efforts of each coun-
try and the maximum utilisation of domestic resources.
It was recognised that <xt least twenty billion dol-
lars of external financial assistance would be required
during a ten-year period, the greater part to be in public
funds and extended on flexible conditions* The United
States pledged to provide a major portion of this assistance,
2including one billion dollars during the first year*
This is the Alliance as it was formed* It is a tre-
mendous undertaking, an attempt to implement a revolution in
social and economic conditions within the bounds of evolu-
tionary, democratic political processes* Jr. Jose A* Mora,
Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States,
has called the Alliance "the most important movement of the
present day toward giving greater meaning and substance to a
3permanent association of American nations*"
2Ibid * , p* 4, in the Declaration of the Peoples of
America."""
Pan American Union, The Jvnamics of the Alliance and
the Inter-American System , Memorandum of "She Secretary-











The Charter of Punta del 2s te made the Alliance a
program of the Organization of American States. Overall
policy direction is vested in the Inter-American Economic
and Social Council, which meets annually in consecutive
meetings at the expert and ministerial levels for a review
of the progress made during the year. The Ministers review
the work of the Alliance, analyze and discuss the problems
and achievements in each country, exchange opinions on pos-
sible measures to intensify further progress, prepare
reports on the outlook for the future and make appropriate
recommendations on policies and measures to promote economic
4
and social development. Constituted as it is of high-level
representatives of each of the CAS member governments, the
ECOSOC exerts a strong influence on the governments for con-
certed action although it cannot force any country to take
action.
The actual direction of Alliance matters under the
CCOSOC is assigned to the Inter-American Committee for the
Allianc for Progress (CIAp), which was established in
November, 1963, at the S*o Paulo meeting. This committee
4Appended Resolution o, Charter of fcunta del ^ste .











was formed in an attempt to Latinize the Alliance and pro-
vide more multilateral control as a result of the special
reports of former Presidents Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil
and Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia. The first regular
meeting of the Committee was held in July, 1964, in Mexico
City under the chairmanship of Carlos Sanz de Santamaria of
5Colombia. ~"-ie duties of the Committee include studying the
problems of the Alliance and resolving or suggesting solu-
tions to them, making an annual estimate of the financial
resources needed and those available, and making a continu-
ing review of the Alliance. The key duty could be the
preparation of annual proposals for determining the distribu-
tion among the several countries of public funds available
under the Alliance. For the immediate future this "power
of suggestion" does not appear to be overly significant; but
there is an inherent possibility of increased influence for
the committee, and the committee may be able to increase
financing from sources other than the United States.
5Inter-American Committee on The Alliance for Progress,
Final Report, r'irst Heetinq of the Inter-American Committee
on the Alliance for Progress , CIAp/71 (Washington:"" Pan
TSserican Union, 1964).
Inter-American economic and Social Council, r'inal
Report of the Second Annual Meeting , at the Ministerial
Level, In 3*o Paulo, Brazi 1 , November , 1963 (Washington:









The "Panel of Nine" high-level experts will serve in
an advisory capacity to the CIAP* The Panel was originally
formed with the primary purpose of evaluating national
development plans for which it provides members of ad hoc
committees* This body is essentially a group of inter-
national public servants which has performed very important
work in evaluating national development plans, providing
guidance to the presenting governments and helping obtain
financial and technical assistance. By virtue of the
ability and reputation of the members, the panel has con-
tributed to the public image of the Alliance and has been
able to cooperate effectively with the various officials and
agencies concerned with the Alliance, particularly with the
7financial institutions.
The Secretariat of the GAS has important functions in
the work of the Alliance* The post of Assistant Secretary
for Economic and Social Affairs has been created, and the
incumbent also serves as Executive Secretary of both the
SCOSOC and the CIAP* Under the Assistant Secretary, there
are four departments of he Pan American Union: Social
Affai. s, Economic Affairs, Statistics and Technical Coopera-
tion* These departments have expanded considerably, and
7The new relationship of the Panel of Nine to the
CIAP is found in ibid*, p. 13* The duties of the tanel are
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they furnish the technical, clerical, and some of the re*
search assistance for implementing the Alliance. The tech-
nical cooperation program has been stepped up and includes
the administration of regional training centers and direct
technical assistance missions throughout Latin America,
fellowship and exchange programs, and in cooperation with
SCLA and IDB, advisory groups for development planning* The
activities of the Secretariat in economic and social develop-
ment have markedly increased under the impetus of the
Alliance.8
III. IHTSR-AMSRICAN DEVSLOPKSHT BAMK
One of the most important institutions of the Alli-
ance for Progress is outside the structure of the QA5,
although it is closely related* The Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank is a multilateral financing institution for
development projects* Zt was organized at the end of the
1950 *s and commenced operations on October 1, 1960—a symbol
of the triumph of Latin American aspirations and ideas for
development financing* The United States had been resisting
Latin demands for a separate bank since World War II*
The expanding role of the Secretariat is described
in Inter-American Economic Council, The Alliance for progress :
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£ach of the twenty member countries has a representa-
tive on the Board of Governors, but control is exercised by
seven executive directors, six elected by groups of Latin
American States, and one appointed by the United States
Government. Voting is weighted in accordance with the
capital subscribed; the United States has 41*82 per cent of
gthe votes. Simple majority votes are required for regular
operations, but two-thirds majorities are required to ap-
prove loans from the Fund for Special Operations and the
Social Progress Trust Fund*
The Bank's own resources are used for a wide variety
of public and private development activities* The Social
Progress Trust Fund is a special fund for social development
established and financed by the United States but adminis-
tered by the IDB. This fund is used only for social
development projects in the fields of land settlement and
improved land use, low-income housing, community water
g
IDB, Fourth Annual Report , 1963 (Washington, 1964),
p. 36. This report also provides an excellent, concise
summary of IDE activities*
The agreement is contained in IDB, Social Progress
Trust ?und Agreement, Social Progress Fund (Washington,
1961)* The IDB publishes very comprehensive reports under
the title: Social Progress Trust Fund . Annual Report .
These reports contain interesting, informative accounts of
social and economic progress in Latin America in addition to
Trust Fund information*
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supply and sanitation and education as specified in th«
agreement* Loans frosa the Trust Fund and from the Fund for
Special Operations are made at lower interest rates and
easier terms of repayment than loans from the ordinary
capital resources.
IV. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
A few authors have noted the possible significance of
economic integration, although this is not stressed in most
discussions of the Alliance. Srnest R. May states:
If the Charter of funta del Cste proves to be more
than splendid rhetoric, it augurs a time when all
Latin American nations will have given up to one
another some of the sovereignty they have so far
jealously treasured, when they will play cooperative
and competitive roles in a common market, when there
will be inter-American institutions insuring and pro-
tecting the flow of capital and credit, when, in
short, their economics will be joined to one another
at least as closely as are the states of the North
American Union. 11
President Kennedy included economic integration as the
fourth point in his proposal for the Alliance on March 13,
1961, and it is included in the Charter of Punta del Cste.
The building of a strong, integrated Latin American economic
community with possible subsequent political integration is
an eventuality which could have a very pronounced effect on
11Srnest R. May, **The Alliance for Progress in His-





the political and security relationships of the United
States* Thus far, progress in this regard has been rather
limited except for the Central American Common Market*
Pros the point of view of progressive Latin Ameri-
cans, the Alliance is a cooperative venture, a Latin Ameri-
can attempt to bring their countries into the mainstream of
a modern, industrialized, affluent world society with the
help of the United States.
The Alliance for Progress was the crowning confirma-
tion of a Latin American policy seeking to effect a
change in the traditional postures of the United
States of America with regard to the possibilities
for the latter *s development* It was, at the same
time, the imposition of a new way of looking at the
Latin American governments* obligations to their
peoples* 12
There would appear to be some contradiction between
this view of the Alliance as a multilateral, Latin American
undertaking and our thesis that the Alliance is an instru-
ment of United States security policy* However, the common
objectives and merging interests are very clear; therefore,
we have a classical alllam a, each member benefiting from
his memi rship, United States security interests included*
12Alberto Lleras Camargo, "The Alliance for Progress:
Aims, Distortions, Obstacles," Foreign Affairs , XLII






UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION FOR THE ALLIANCE
The Secretary of State is responsible for the super-
vision and general direction of the entire foreign assist-
ance program* The Alliance for Progress is a part of the
United tates foreign aid program, and, in this chapter, it
will be shown how the government has organised to insure
that the Alliance serves as an instrument of foreign policy
under the Secretary and helps achieve the security objec-
tives defined in previous chapters*
In the early months of the Kennedy administration, a
large-scale reorganisation took place* There was a Task
Force on Foreign Economic Assistance, a Task Force on Latin
America, and the new Agency for International Development
and the Alliance for Progress were both being born at about
the same time* Ideas were being generated in the White
House and in various places inside and outside the Depart-
ment of State* The diffusion of authority and responsibility
continued for some time* A more effective control of re-
sponsibility evolved as the Department of State absorbed the
Alliance into its political and foreign assistance machinery*
Time, LXXXIII (January 31, 1964), 18* A State De-
partment source has recommended this article as an accurate
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The responsibility for execution of the Alliance was assigned
to the Agency for International Development, and, in early
1962, the Assistant Administrator for Latin America was
given the additional task of Coordinator of the Alliance for
Progress.
I. THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The Administrator of AID, currently David £• Bell,
ranks as an Undersecretary of State and, under the Secretary,
is responsible for the coordination of foreign assistance*
Line responsibility is vested in four regional bureaus, each
headed by an Assistant Administrator. However, there are a
number of committees and a very large staff organisation
which tend to interfere somewhat with the direct line of
responsibility.
The Office of Development Finance and Private Enter-
prise establishes policies and procedures for all capital
assistance, coordinates loan operations with other agencies
and promotes United States private investment and mobilize*
tion of private capital in beneficiary countries. This
office reviews all loans. The Office of Engineering de-
velops engineering policies and standards and oversees
engineering practices in the Agency. The Office of Material
Resources administers the use of government surplus property







agencies providing relief assistance* The Office of Program
Coordination engages in overall program and policy planning,
economic analysis, and the review and coordination of all
assistance programs. An Office of Technical Cooperation and
Research and Offices of Labor Affairs and Public Safety have
bean adde^i. Of course, there are also administrative,
legal, inspection, public information, congressional liaison
and assorted other offices and staffs.
The Bureau for Latin America has now been integrated
with the Department of State Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs and will be discussed later* The overseas operations
of the Agency are carried out by AIO Missions* Under the
"country team" concept, the Ambassador is the ranking member
of the team* The Mission Director is the chief aid officer,
and he maintains close contact with the Ambassador and with
Washington* The country team is receiving increased au-
thority and flexibility for program planning and execution*
The Mission Director or the Ambassador may reject unsound
proposals on the spot and forward appropriate recommendations
to Washington* The most important decisions are made in
Washington, but projects costing less than $200,000 can be
approved and funded by the Mission Director; and the Mission
does exert strong influence on the programming of assistance
to the host country*
Coordination has been a great problem of foreign
j.;-: ».
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assistance. The Department of State and AID are big organi-
sations; and the Sxport-Iiaport Bank, the Treasury and
Defense Departments, the Peace Corps, and the Departments of
Commerce, Agriculture and Labor are all involved, along with
other government, private, and international organizations*
This coordination of effort is carried out at many levels*
The National Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Problems coordinates policy at the highest level*
The members are the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of
State, Secretary of Commerce, Chairman of the Board of the
Federal Reserve System, and the President of the Export-
Import Bank* Much of the coordination at lower levels has
been within AID itself or accomplished by AID personnel*
The Development Loan Committee meets on an average of twice
a month to establish standards and criteria for lending
operations and also considers large loan applications and
those which do not meet standard policy requirements* This
committee is composed of the AID Administrator, the J resi-
dent of the Export-Import Bank, the Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs, and the Assistant AID
Administrator for Development Finance and Private Enter-
prise* Within the Bureau, the Office of Capital Develop-
ment, the Offices of Planning and Programs, Institutional
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well as loan committees, legal staff, and other interested
2parties and offices are Involved*
The coaplex structure and procedures stay be looked at
as an effective management effort to obtain maximum benefit
from t. e taxpayers' dollars or as a bureaucratic jungle
stifling the Alliance* The process of getting a loan ap-
proved may take from several months to several years* This
delay is a frequent complaint among Latin Americans- as are
3the conditions imposed* A year ago, Frank K* Coffin, than
Deputy Administrator for Operations, stated that no function
of government had been so thoroughly studied and reorganised
in recent years as has foreign aid* Many other problems
also confront the policy makers, however, and another re-
organisation was felt necessary*
II. THE J0HHS0K-MA1M RSORGANI2ATIGM
In December, 1963, President Lyndon Johnson appointed
2Information on aid was uncovered largely through in-
terviews, partly through these publications! U*S* Department
oi itate, Organizational Information , Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs and Bureau for Latin America, aid (Washing-
ton , 1964 ) t Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance
Program for Fiscal 7ear"T96Z (Washington. 1963}; and AID.,
Principles diHrorelqn Xssistance (Washington, 1963)*
Pan American Union, Sequnda Inforne de la Momina de
las Nueve al Conseio Interarmerlcano £conomlco '
"
"Social7
cm7T^(^hlngion , 13o3), p* 56* *
4Prank H* Coffin, Foreign Aid, Controversy and Reality*
Remarks at Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Boston, Kass-
chusetts, September 11, 1963 (Washington: AID, 1963), p* 2*
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Thomas C. Mann to the post of Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter^American Affairs • The President made clear that
Mann would have effective policy control over all aspects of
U.S. policy In Latin America by also designating him as
Special President, a 1 Advisor and U.S. Coordinator of the
Alliance for Progress. This centralization of authority and
responsibility was an important move to remedy some of the
problems mf diffusion of authority and confusion of policy
that were possible when State and AID had divided responsi-
bilities.
On February 14, 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk
approved an agreement between the aid Administrator and
Assistant Secretary Mann which gave Mann broad powers within
AID, integrated the Latin American geographic offices of AID
into new groupings and provided for increased priorities and
cooperation for Alliance matters from AID.
The new organization of the Bureau is shown in Figure
1 ( infra , p. 42) • The Offices of Development Planning and
Programs, Capital Development, Institutional Development,
and hanagement and Operations, and some of the staffs re-
tained their AID lndentlty. AID personnel report to Deputy
Coordinator William D. Rogers. The nine geographic offices
are headed by Directors, who may be either State or AID
Officers. The Deputy Director or the Assistant Director for
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Junior personnel are utilized with some flexibility in the
geographic offices. The key point, however, is that the
Director is the single focal point in Washington for infor-
mation, advice, and guidance concerning political, military,
economic, and social conditions, events, and trends in his
country, reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary.
There is one voice for Latin America at the top; there is
one voice for each geographic office.
Senator Hubert Humphrey wrote i "If those responsible
for the direction of the Alliance aid program are to stand a
chance of success, they must have the authority commensurate
with their responsibilities." Mr. Mann apparently has been
given more authority than any one individual previously
exercised in the Alliance. In addition, he has delegated
authority to his subordinates, and the policy for Latin
America has been unified. The streamlining and concentration
5U.S. Congress, Senate, A Report on the Alliance for
Progress . 1963 , Report by Sen* Hubert Humphrey to the Com-
mittee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Sen. Doc., No. 13, 8&* Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 13. Earlier in this
report (on p. 9), Sen. Humphrey stated: "It is silly to
think that a program of the magnitude of the Aliansa para el
Progreso can be carried out without making any mistakes.
Indeed, the effort to do so is the biggest mistake of all.
The most sterile box score is the one that reads, *no runs,
no hits , no errors • ' A team can survive a few errors if it
gets some runs; but no matter how flawless its play, it will
surely lose without runs. The Allanza has made a few hits;
it has managed to get some men on base. But it badly needs
some runs, and it ought to be prepared to take a few chances
to get them."
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of responsibility affords a better chain of command and
should improve results, although the staff and functional
offices of AID are still somewhat removed from this new
"policy machine."
Another agency involved in Alliance work is the Peace
Corps, a separate agency also under the Department of State.
The objectives of the Corps are to provide trained manpower
for underdeveloped countries and to promote better under-
standing between peoples. The Corps provides personnel in a
middle skill level, not highly skilled technical experts.
More than fifteen hundred volunteers serve in fourteen
Alliance countries as teachers, agricultural extension
workers, surveyors, water and sanitation workers, nurses and
nurses' aides, medical technicians, vocational and athletic
instructors, youth group organizers and community develop-
ment workers. Unlike professional and technical specialists
engaged in technical assistance programs, the Peace Corps
workers usually serve under host country supervision to fill
immediate manpower needs. Their jobs extend from digging
ditches to running educational television stations.
Peace Corps activities are conducted separately from
those of the Embassy and other U.S. agencies in a country.
However, the Peace Corps officials consult with the Embassy
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and the AID mission when its program is being formulated, as
well as with the Department of State and AID in Washington*
AXD planners attempt to coordinate Peace Cosrpa projects with
other programs to avoid duplication and take full advantage
of the accomplishments of the Corps. The Peace Corps has
proved to be a very popular innovation in the field of for-
eign assistance and has thereby contributed to an improved
image of the Administration's aid program*
III. OTHER OOVSRHftEIIT AGSWCISS
The fact that one man is now supposed to exercise
policy control over all aspects of United States policy in
Latin America is by no means assured merely within the
Department of State* A great many other government depart-
ments and agencies are also deeply Involved in the Alliance*
The Export-Import Bank is an independent agency of
the U*S* Government which furnishes a substantial portion of
American funds for Latin American development* The Bank was
established to assist United States exporters and importers,
and much of its activity cannot be classified as foreign
assistance* Nevertheless, up to June 30, 1964, the Bank had
authorised over $758,000,000 in loans which are considered a
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for the procurement of U.S. goods and services, such as
those for industrial or public utility projects which need
considerable machinery from the United States. The Bank
finances only U.S. dollar costs and it generally imposes
higher interest rates and shorter terms than AID. Loans are
made available to private as well as public organizations,
helping to encourage private investment. The Bank cooperates
closely with AID. In addition to the Development Loan Com-
mittee, there is a liaison committee which coordinates the
activities of the Bank and AID on specific lending proposals.
The Department of Commerce plays a very important
role in publicizing and encouraging the contribution which
the financial, technical, and managerial resources of United
States private industry can make. It promotes private in-
vestment as a means of supplying the necessary capital for
economic development. The Office of International Invest-
ment assists in identifying and documenting specific situa-
tions in which American investors can make contributions to
Latin American Development and in stimulating the interest
of United States firms in pursuing such opportunities. In
attempting to mobilize American private sector support for
the Alliance, the Department has created the Commerce Commit-
tee on the Alliance for Progress which consists of twenty
nine leaders of United States firms with special knowledge
of Latin America. The committee has sought to identify
c*«A i
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specific investment opportunities and has made significant
studies and recommendations on actions needed to stimulate
private investment, including tax concessions* The Office
of Technical Services provides assistance under contract
with AID, and the American Republics Division of the Office
of International Regional Economics maintains liaison with
all interested agencies*
The Treasury Department has a major interest and re-
sponsibility in international economic and financial matters
and has played an important role in the evolution of the
Alliance* The Secretary of the Treasury led the American
delegation to several of the OAS meetings, including the
Fxinta del Este meeting in 1961 which launched the Alliance
and the First Annual meeting at Mexico City in 1962* Treas-
ury officials worked closely with the Department of State in
making the arrangements for financing economic and social
development projects in the hemisphere in the formative
period from 1958 through 1962*
The Secretary of the Treasury is chairman of the
National Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Problems which is charged with coordination of
United States policies in the field of international finance*
The Council or its staff committee reviews all policy mat-
ters and directs the decisions of U*S* Directors of the
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also is represented on all of the special coordinating or
liaison conedttees including the development Loan Committee*
Treasury operates the Exchange Stabilisation Fund to provide
short-term foreign exchange support, generally in conjunc-
tion with an IMF stand-by arrangement coordinated with State
and aid* In addition, a continuous interchange of ideas
takes place between Treasury staff personnel, particularly
in the Office of International Affairs, and the staffs of
other agencies. This office directs and coordinates the
activities of Treasury agents in the diplomatic missions
abroad, assists in coordinating financial policies in inter-
national institutions and government agencies, and advises
on financial problems arising in any of the programs* The
Office of International Tax Affairs also cooperates in the
work of the Alliance* The Foreign Tax Assistance Staff of
the Internal Revenue Service provides assistance in tax ad-
ministration to other governments including direct advisory
and visitation service, training programs, furnishing of
manuals and materials, helping with recruitment of special-
ized personnel, and conducting surveys and studies*
The Departments of Agriculture and Labor have been
involved for some time in activities in Latin America and
make important contributions to the development programs of
the Alliance in research, technical assistance, and other
ways* The Food for Peace Program, which is a highly
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significant part of the Alliance, is an outgrowth of and
dependent upon an Agriculture Department program. The
Defense Department naturally has an interest in the Alliance
because of the interdependence of all foreign assistance
programs and their relation to security in the hemisphere,
and also because of the current utilization of the military
in under-developed nations. In addition to participating in
the coordination and review of the assistance plans and
programs, Defense includes civic action projects in its
military assistance programs and is training Latin-American
military leaders for participation in development work.
The Bureau of the Budget, the Census Bureau, the
Bureau of Public Roads, and the Housing and Home Finance
Agency have cooperated with aid by lending their special
skills and talents to strengthen United States efforts in
the Alliance. The Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare also provides highly important assistance in the fields
of Public Health, medical research, education, and various
other specialized areas.
IV. NGN-GGVSRNKSNTAL ORGANIZATIONS
There is a great deal of non-governmental participa-
tion in programs related to the Alliance. Private business
investment is one of the key aspects of the Alliance*
Literally hundreds of other organizations also have some
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interest in Latin American affairs and promote activities or
provide assistance related to the Alliance* Foundations,
universities, sister-cities, clubs, unions, relief agencies,
and many other types of organisations contribute to Latin
American welfare and development*
From 1960 through 1962, the Ford, Kellogg, and Rocke-
feller Foundations alone expended over $25,000,000 in grants
7in Latin America* AID has contracted with the American
Institute for Frmm Labor Development to carry out a
hemisphere-wide effort to combine United States and Latin
American union resources in training democratic union leaders
and developing social projects needed by workers to raise
their living standards. The AFL-CIC has h%^n active in
various Institute projects and other activities on behalf of
labor in Latin America* The Cooperative League of the USA,
the Credit Union National Association, and the Rational
Rural Electric Cooperative Association are all engaged in
important work for the Alliance*
Fifty-eight American cities are working with cities
in seventeen Latin American countries in sponsoring a
variety of community development projects* Several of the
7AID » ftgpo^t to the Inter-American Sconomic and Social
Council * presented by the Government of the United1 States to
the Second Annual Heatings at S&o Paulo, Brasil (Washington,
1963), p. 101*











sister-cities are assisting and advising their count- ts
cm planning and administration* The State of California has
arranged with Chile to make available the accumulated ex-
perience and the research and development resources of the
state*
Many business firms are conducting training programs
and other activities which contribute to better relations as
well as economic growth* Voluntary organisations, such as
CARS, Church World Service, Catholic Relief Service, and
many others, contribute food, services, tools, and technical
assistance*
This type of private participation is important for
economic and social progress but also is currently a factor
in the ideological struggle for the minds of many in i-atin
America* Most of the non-governmental efforts are not under
any real control by the government, but State and AID
furnish guidance, assistance in some cases, and attempt to
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CHAPTER VI
UNITED STATES PROGRAMS
In the previous chapter, the organization for the
Alliance has been shown; now some of the things that are
being done will be related. American assistance in millions
of dollars is shown in Table I below:
TABLE I
UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA
OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS























EXIMBANK 262.6 91.2 172.2
FOOD FOR PEACE 134.5 185.5 370.0
PEACE CORPS 7.3 15.2 17.6
SOCIAL PROGRESS
TRUST FUND 224.4 124.8 38.4
TOTAL 1,103.6 972.6 1 ,229.4
GRANTS 310.6 275.1 336.9
LOANS 793.0 697.5 892.4
SOURCE: AID, U.S. Assistance to Latin America , iblxqations
and Loan Authorlsatlons . W 194^-fV l'$63 Washington. i§&3).
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It is apparent that substantial government financial
resources have been made available through the Alliance*
The assistance takes many forms* Because the long-range
goal is to make self-sustaining the growth of the United
States neighbors, a large proportion of the assistance is in
the form of loans and technical assistance for infrastruc-
ture and economic development projects* However, other
problems and other objectives require various programs in
support of the different aspects of the Alliance*
I. DEVELOPMENT LOANS
A primary objective of the Alliance is to bring the
social and economic development of each country to a point
where it becomes capable of self-sustaining growth on its
own human and capital resources and its ability to attract
investment and credit* In pursuit of this objective, the
largest portion of United States aid funds is used for
development loans* These loans are intended for high
priority capital projects which either produce revenue
directly, are important to the economic infrastructure of a
country, or promote important social development* This in-
cludes establishing or expanding manufacturing facilities,
development banks, power, ports, transportation and communi-
cation facilities, and also schools, hospitals, housing and
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generally finance the foreign exchange costs involved. They
nay be used to finance general import programs in support of
a comprehensive development program or some sector of a pro-
gram, and to finance engineering and feasibility studies for
individual projects. Technical assistance required in train-
ing personnel for a particular project may also be funded
from the loan for the project. Capital project loans may
include provision for management and training assistance not
only to initiate operations but to carry on until local
personnel can effectively operate the project. These loans
are available to governments and to private enterprise.
Loan terms are based upon the objectives of promoting long-
term foreign debt. Maturity terms range from fifteen to
forty years with grace periods up to ten years. Interest
rates are usually substantially below the maximum of five
and three quarters per cent, averaging two and six tenths
per cent in calendar year 1962.
Criteria to be applied in granting loans have bean
fixed by legislation to include
i
1. The responsiveness of the recipient country to
the vital economic, political and social con-
cerns of its people and the demonstration of
determination to take effective self-iK-
measures j
2. The economic and technical soundness of the
activity to be financed;
aid, Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance
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3* The relationship to other development activities
and its contribution to realisable long-term
objectives;
4. The possible effects on the United States economy;
5. Whether financing could be obtained in whole or
in part from other free world sources on reason-
able terns;
6. The efforts made to repatriate capital invested
in other countries by citizens of the recipient
country.*
Additional limitations were added in 1962 which for-
bid aid to countries that nationalize, expropriate, or seise
property of United States citizens or corporations without
speedy and equitable compensation or do not settle govern-
ment indebtedness to American citizens* Restrictions also
include the requirement that financial and technical plan-
ning and a reasonable estimate of cost be completed prior to
signing agreements, limitations on the source and origin of
goods and services, shipment on American flag vessels, and
restrictions on assistance to countries engaging in certain
aid or trade with Cuba.
Many of the loans made by the Export-Import Bank are
for periods in excess of five years and can be considered
along with AID development loans. Recent examples of loans
authorized under the Alliance by AID or exikbank include:
2Ibid ., pp. 16-17.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 , as amended August 1,
1962
,
quoted in AID, Report to tKe Inter-American Economic
and Social Council , FreparedHEy the Government oT the United
States of America ( Washington , 196 3 ) , pp • 75- 76 . Cited
hereafter as Report to the SCOSQC .
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BRAZIL
$4*3 million for expansion of electric
.
pro-
duction and distribution in the central part of
u«e country}
S24 million for loans for road construction and
for the purchase of road maintenance equipment
in the Northeast)
5.5 million for expansion and modernization of
the Volta Redonda Steel Mill.
CHILE
$40 million for importation of essentials to
achieve and maintain investment and development
levels under National Development Plan;
$11.3 million loan from EXIMBANK for U.S. capital
equipment to increase production of steel
company;
$7.0 million to Chilean Port Authority for port
construetlon
;
$1.3 million loan from EXIMBANK for U.3. elec-
tronic equipment for aviation network.
COLOMBIA
$17.5 million loan from EXIMBANK to National
electric Institute for improvement and expan-
sion of municipal electric power systems;
$6.0 million in three loans from EXIKBANX to
private concerns for machinery, equipment and
plant expansion. 4
II. TECHNICAL COOPERATION
Technical assistance and development grants are also
Loan information extracted from unpublished report
by Thomas C. Mann, "Report to the President on Alliance for
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Important to the United States Alliance effort. Both of
these forms of assistance are particularly needed
least-developed nations, but they have relevance throughout
Latin America* They may be provided to governments, public
institutions, and to private entrepreneurs* Governments and
quasi-governmental organizations receive the greater part of
this assistance* Many of the countries need help in govern-
ment administration before programs for development can be
effectively planned* AID arranges for expert technical
assistance to help bring the capabilities of the local in-
stitutions up to the necessary level* Implementation of
long-range development programs requires even more highly
trained personnel. Education and training are indispensable*
The emphasis has been placed on creating lasting institu-
tions, such as specialized schools and institutes, agricul-
tural centers, and training and exchange programs to make
these advances self-sustaining* Approximately £240,000,000
was provided through AID for technical assistance in the
5first two years of the Alliance* This extensive effort
supplements and is coordinated with the UN, CAS, and Tri-
partite programs, which are, in large part, supported by
U.S* funds* Technical assistance is being provided in
greater proportion now under contract by universities and
5
Report to the 2CG30C
. p. 109.













private organisations. Fifty Savings and Loan Associations
and five hundred credit unions have been organised, and over
one thousand labor union leaders have received training
under these contract programs*
Recent development grants for more than 12,000,000
have been made to Bolivia for road construction, tax and
fiscal reform, and improved administration, and agriculture
7demonstration centers*
III. SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE
supporting assistance has been defined as "economic
aid used to advance United States national security and for-
eign policy objectives in situations where basic economic
conditions make the strict criteria of development assist-
ance inapplicable* " Most of it goes to countries where
external or internal security needs are critical, but it is
also used to help maintain economic stability where military
problems may not be a primary concern* Supporting assist-
ance has been necessary in many cases in order to relieve
balance of payments pressures or budgeting difficulties* A
6Ibid *. p. 110*
Mann, op * cit * . p* 3*
££»£&
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goal of the program is to eliminate the necessity for this
kind of aid* Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, and * anama are among the
countries which have received this type of assistance si,
the start of the Alliance. AID, SXIMBAHK, and the Treasury
Department all provide emergency assistance and coordinate
their actions with the International Monetary Fund.
Supporting assistance is directly related to some of
our short-term objectives* It may bolster a friendly govern-
ment, provide political and economic stability, maintain a
presence, and perhaps gain us friendship and influence*
Bolivia, Brazil, Haiti, and Panama have received this type
of assistance during the first six months of this calendar
9year*
IV. GNCOURAGIHG PRIVATS IKVSSTKSWT
A most important aspect of American participation in
the Alliance is the encouragement of the development of
private enterprise in Latin America* One reason for this is
the current ideological struggle between Marxist-Communism
and the free enterprise system* Another very persuasive
reason is the contribution which private enterprise can make
to the immense development task* The public sector is
9AID, U.J. Assistance to Latin America , op . cit •
,






already rather large in many Latin American countries, and
taking into account the limitations to tne availabi ^fcy
of public funds, it is clear that the objectives of
the Alliance cannot be achieved without the full par-
ticipation of the private sector and adequate measures
must be taken to assure maximum contribution to growth
by the private sector .i0
The encouragement of private enterprise has the particularly
active support of the Congress, the Commerce Department, and
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, along with AID. Loans are one
form of assistance. Private borrowers, both American and
Latin American, are eligible for development loans. Invest-
ments which contribute to economic development and are re-
lated to long-range development plans are encouraged by aij.
The investment in a new enterprise, or expansion or diversi-
fication of an existing one, must be approved by the govern-
ment of the country in which the loan is to be made and must
clearly contribute to economic development. Dollar loans
are normally granted either by the SXIKBAHK or AID to
finance procurement of United States goods and services.
Local currency loans may be made under Title I of *.L. 480.
These "Cooley Loans" may be used for local costs including
land acquisition, expansion of plant and equipment,
Inter-American ECOSOC, Final Report t First Annual
Meeting , At the Ministerial Level in Mexico City, October,
1962 (Washington, 1963), p. 116. Also see Frank Brandenburg,
The development of Latin American Private Enterprise (Wash-
ington: kationaY~F lannlng Association, 19^3) for a treat-














industrial training, working capital, and other normal c
of operation* More than 14,000,000 worth of local curren-
cies were loaned by aid under this program in fiscal 1963.
Another important incentive for private investors is
the Investment Guaranty Program. AID provides the assurance
of the U.S. Government that tfct investor will be protected
up to an amount specified in a guaranty. Specific risk
guarantees are granted against inconvertibility of foreign
currency, expropriation or confiscation, and loss due to
war. Bilateral agreements are in force between the Unite
States and seventeen of the nineteen Alliance SMabers to
provide these guarantees. All guarantee convertibility,
fifteen protect against expropriation, and seven Include war
risk as well. In early 1964, there *er& $400,000,000 in
guarantees to United States private investors in force under
12
the program. At the end of fiscal 1963, 665 applications
were on hand for Latin American guarantees of almost
S3 ,000, 000, 000. Two types of extended risk guarantees are
also available. Under the general guaranty, AID may Insure
up to 75 p&x cent of an investment up to $ 10, 000, 000 in
Seymour teyser, "Role of Frivate Enterprise," Inter-
national Commerce , LXIX (November 4, 1963), p. 10.
12
' AID, Proposed Mutual Defense and Development rro-
qrarcs Y 1965 ,""op. clt . t p. So.
p. 17.
13





priority development projects where private investment would
not otherwise be made. Political and commercial risks,
other than those normally insurable, are covered* The
second type of extended risk guaranty is limited to private
American investment in self-liquidating pilot or demonstra-
tion housing projects in Latin America* This latter type is
intended to stimulate home ownership by middle income fami-
lies by guaranteeing long term mortgage-type financing of
housing projects.
Another encouragement to investors is the investment
survey program under which AID underwrites half of the cost
of investigating the feasibility of private investment oppor-
tunities* In order for AID to participate, there must exist
reasonable prospects that the survey will result in an in-
vestment, the enterprise must contribute to economic develop-
ment of the country and be consistent with the country *s
development program* If the firm decides to proceed with
the investment, It repays aid's share of the survey cost*
Nineteen surveys, costing £418,000 and representing a poten-
tial $41,000,000 investment, were approved in the first two
14years of the Alliance*
Efforts to stimulate private enterprise are also
directed toward encouraging Latin American businessmen and
14Report to SCOSOC . op * cit., p* 92.
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firms to participate productively in their national econo-
mies* This is done through technical and financial assist-
ance to investment promotion institutions, industrial
development institutions, productivity centers, industrial
parks, training programs, and other assistance projects.
One of the most fundamental factors in the growth of private
enterprise is the availability of credit. AID has provided
more than $280,000,000 to Latin American development banks
and is encouraging more reasonable credit terms in a wide
range of financing institutions. Also, a Private Investment
Fund was established in Colombia in early 1963 with the help
of AID and approved more than $24,000,000 in loans from Hay
15through December. In Colombia, a pilot project is under-
way to determine how private programs can best be integrated
into a national development program. AID and the Commerce
Department, working with the government and private inter-
ests in Colombia, are applying all of the known techniques
and resources available to promote a limited number of in-
dustries which have been identified in Colombia's Ten year
Development Plan as meriting special attention. Joint ven-
tures of United States and local businessmen are encouraged
as a particularly effective method of building a strong
private sector.
"Private Investment Fund," report prepared by J. D.
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Tax incentives ere another Measure for encouraging
private investment* Various credits, exemptions, exclusions,
and other measures have been taken in Latin America to pro-
mote investment in key development sectors* The Administra-
tion in the United States has proposed new tax credits on
investments and reinvested earnings for investors in develop-
ing countries, and other measures to encourage private
American capital to flow South*
V. POOD FOR PSACE
The Food for Peace program enables surplus American
agricultural products to be used to feed hungry Latin Ameri-
cans and to contribute to development programs at the same
time* Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954, provides the authority for this
program* The Department of Agriculture determines the type
and quantity of products available, supervises their handling
up to the port of embarkation and is responsible for carrying
out the sales agreements and barter provisions of the Act*
AID administers the overseas operations of the program and
coordinates this program with the rest of the foreign aid
program* The Director of Food for Peace is a special presi-
dential assistant on the White House staff* He coordinates
the program as a whole* The foodstuffs may be distributed
in cooperation with voluntary relief organisations or by
^ti fi>M M ton
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agencies of the host countries and other United States agen-
cies both public and private*
Title I sales agreements call for payment in local
currency which then remains within the purchasing country
and is used for loans or grants for economic development.
Up to 25 per cent of these funds can be used for RCooley
Loans" to private enterprise, part of the remainder is used
to pay for local costs of the embassy and other United
States Government programs.
Title II authorises the use of the commodities for
feeding children, self-help development projects and emer-
gency purposes* Part or all of the wages for work performed
on development projects is paid in foodstuffs, or in money
derived from the sale of these products* A number of impor-
tant public development projects benefiting the entire
community have been carried out through this method*
Title III authorises the distribution of the surplus
food through accredited non-profit relief agencies and inter-
governmental organisations and also provides for the barter
of these commodities for strategic and other material goods
and equipment* The Red Cross, CARS, church organisations,
U*N* specialised agencies, and other welfare and relief
organizations distribute the food* A special part of this
program, called "Operation Nirtos," is being undertaken for
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children in eighteen Alliance countries are receiving the
benefits of this food. In fiscal 1963, the Latin American
countries contributed over $13,000,000 to this part of the
program, not including personnel costs. United States costs
amounted to well over $28,000,000 for the same period. An
important side benefit of the program has been a reduction
of absenteeism and drop-outs from the schools.
Title IV provides for credit sales of the commodities
for ultimate repayment in American dollars. The local cur-
rency generated by the sale of the products is used for
economic and social development projects. Credit periods
may be extended up to twenty years, and the interest is
three—quarters of one per cent.
The Pood for Peace programs accomplish a number of
humanitarian and development objectives, but they have also
caused a certain amount of problems. Considerable care must
be exercised to see that our surplus food does not disturb
world and regional market conditions and lead to more wide-
spread hardships than benefits. Many cases of misappropria-
tion of foodstuffs have been alleged in recent years.
However, in the case of Latin America, P.L. 480 programs are
carefully monitored and appear to be quite successful.
16
Report to the ECOSOC
, p. 86.
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The Alliance was not conceived as a military program,
but one of President Kennedy's ten points in his original
Allanza speech included the statement "that armies cannot
only defend their countries—-they can, as we have learned
17through our own Corps of Engineers, help to build them.
AID is now making funds, equipment and material available
for projects undertaken by Latin American governments under
civic action programs by their military forces.
Most of the Latin American countries are engaged in
some form of civic action program. Among the activities in
progress in 1963 were the following:
Road, airfield and bridge construction,
School construction and educational activities in-
cluding adult literacy and vocational training,






Well digging and providing potable water. i8
17John P. Kennedy, President Kennedy Speaks on the
Alliance for Progress (Washington: AID, 1962;
,
p. 37
Address at White House reception for Latin American diplo-
mats on March 13, 1961.
Hubert S. Cunningham, "Highlights of Civic Action
Programs in Latin America, M in Final Report fourth Confer-
ence of the American Armies (HQ, U.S. Army Forces, Southern









The extent of these programs is rather surprising.
Fifteen United States Mobile Training Teams have operated in
eleven countries of Latin America to assist in training for
civic action operations, and training is also conducted in
Panama and in the United States. There is a certain amount
of argument in some circles, both in Latin America and North
America, concerning the wisdom of these programs. Prom our
security viewpoint, civic action programs make good sense.
In conjunction with counterinsurgency and other internal
security operations, these programs can contribute a great
deal to stability and to development efforts in Latin
America. The violence in Venezuela and Colombia has demon-
strated the need for this type of program, even in countries








Although some critics might argue that multilateral
assistance programs have no proper role in supporting United
States security objectives, there are a number of reasons
why they must be included in this study. In the first
place f they exist, and their role must be examined* Then
too, they exist because they offer advantages to the national
interest of various states, including the United States*
Also, collaboration with other states is essential in find-
ing solutions to some of the international problems involved,
and such organized collaboration helps build a feeling of
community across national borders which can help maintain
(or regain) the hemispheric solidarity the United States
seeks* Finally, the idea of international sponsorship and
administration of development assistance has been recommended
by many influential spokesmen, including some in significant
government positions; and, with the implementation of CIAP,
multilaterally-administered programs may become more impor-
tant in the near future* Regardless of other considerations,
these multilateral programs do contribute to economic devel-
opment, which is one of the United States aims; and they are
unlikely to raise the intervention cry which often causes
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I. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA* STATES
As shown in Chapter IV, supra , the Alliance is an
official part of the OAS under the Inter-American Economic
and Social Council* The SCOSOC created the Inter-American
Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) as
a special, permanent committee of the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council for the purpose of repre-
senting raultilaterally the Alliance for Progress, and,
in the same way, coordinating and promoting its imple-
mentation in accordance with the Charter of Punta del
Este. 1
The CIAP is now in the process of carving out for itself an
influential position in decisions to provide financing for
Alliance projects.
The CIAP has established a program of continual re-
view and evaluation of national development efforts by
special subcommittees* Representatives of major lending
institutions will act as advisers to the subcommittees, and,
hopefully, this will encourage the institutions to follow
CIAP recommendations on grants and loans* The Committee
to speed up the process of obtaining external financing
Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Final
Report , Second Annual Keetinq « at the Ministerial Level, in
Sao Paulo, Brazil, November, 1963 (Washington: Pan American
Union, 1963), p. 10, in Resolution l-M/63, creating CIAP.







and also to increase the total amount of resources made
2
available*
While the CIAP is establishing itself, the work of
the Secretariat proceeds as assigned by the SCOSOC* Both
the augment of Economic and Social Affairs and the
Department of Cultural, Scientific and Educational Affairs
are deeply involved in Alliance work. One of the new pro-
grams is called, "The Ideological and Political Advance of
the Alliance for Progress "—-an attempt to provide all sec-
tors of public opinion in the hemisphere with a thorough
knowledge and understanding of the objectives and achieve-
ments of the Alliance and to secure widespread participation
in the planning and implementation of the Alliance* One
part of this program is the Special Alliance for Progress
Information Team in Washington* Another is the activities
of national committees on the Alliance for Progress, made up
of representatives of the different sectors of national life
in an effort to insure active local participation in each
country* These committees, active in sixteen of the latin
American nations, and subcommittees established in some of
the leading provincial cities are instrumental in getting
2Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress,
Final Report , rirst Meeting of the Inter-American Committee
on th ^llance for Froqreai , Mexico City, July, 1964, CIAP/






Information to the people through periodicals, exhibits,
courses and lecture series, seminars, forums, and working
groups. This is a large—scale propaganda effort operating
to the advantage of the United States but conducted by the
3
nationals of each country under the auspices of the oas.
The technical cooperation program is another very
important aspect of the activities of the gas in support of
the Alliance* This Includes direct technical assistance
teams and missions to assist in such fields as taxation,
agricultural economics, program budgeting, manpower planning,
community development, and the formulation of national de-
velopment plans* The regional training centers accomplish
a double objective by strengthening the existing educational
institution at which it is located as well as training leaders
for some field, such as public administration, agriculture,
social welfare, urban and regional planning, and many other
subjects which are important in the implementation of the
Alliance* Fellowship and exchange programs are also admin-
istered by the GAS* Although this might be considered to be
somewhat removed from our primary interest, there has been
an emphasis on studies related to economic and social devel-
opment; this also s&rv^s as a part of the broader indoctrina-
tion effort*
3A report of the activities of this movement is found
in Intm*. -American Economic and Social Council, The Alliance
for Progress : Its Second Year : 1962-1963 (Washington: Pan
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Much of the work of the Secretariat consists of col-
lecting and analysing data. The information gained from
surveys and studies is made available to the organization
and to the member countries to aid in planning and carrying
out various programs in many different fields. Host of
these activities are conducted in order to help member
tions to help themselves* Budgetary limitations prevent the
GAS from engaging in too much active participation in devel-
opment work, but the studies and technical advice made
available are very worthwhile. Task Forces have been formed
in many areas related to development to facilitate the
gathering and analysis of information and the making of per-
tinent recommendations.
The Secretariat also works closely with KIA and the
Inter-American Development Bank in various activities in
support of the Alliance, such as the annual Economic and
Social Survey of Latin America, advisory groups on develop-
ment planning, taxation, agrarian reform and skilled man-
power and productivity. An agreement signed in March, 1961,
and amended in September, 1962, provides for joint programs
with each member enjoying equal status and remaining respon-
sible to its own governing body.
The following gives an indication of some of the GAS
programs and the budget allocations for them a
Technical Education for the Improvement of
Agriculture and Rural Life 1380,235.00
ens f£ti£i%a&iq ix.L %L» oJ &.
::Ll3tl







Course in Administration of Social
Welfare Programs S 70,216.00
Program for Advanced Training in
Applied Social Sciences 21,016.00
xgram in Business Administration 143,056.00
Training and Studies in Agricultural
Credit 129,085.00
Program in Urban and Regional Planning 295,927.00
Training and Studies in Agrarian Reform 496,491.00
Regional Standardization Program for
Assisting Economic Integration 110,198.00
Training Program for Community
Development 146,525.00
Training Center for Regional Economic
Development 260,732.00
j
These are some of the CAS activities approved for 1964.
II. THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
The establishment of the Inter-American Development
Bank predates the Alliance by a few years and had been
favored by some important elements of the Eisenhower adrain-
istration for some time prior to official approval. The
Bank is a highly important institution in the imp
l
amentation
of the Alliance, and it also provides an excellent method
IA ECOSOC, Final Report » Second Annual Meeting , op .
cit.
, p. 47.
5Milton S. Eisenhower, The Use itter (Garden












for the United States influencing decisions in Latin America
without raising the spectre of intervention* The weighted
voting and selecting of six Executive directors from groups
of Latin American states, as described in Chapter IV, supra,
achieves a balance between national pride and economic par-
ticipation which has contributed toward amicable workl.
relationships* Pmv more money Xlows into Latin America from
other sources, but that does not detract from the importance
of the 133. In addition to its loan operations, the Bank
provides technical assistance, helps to arrange financing
for national development plans, and helps promote regional
economic integration in Latin America*
The original subscriptions, after Cuba failed to con-
tribute, were £313*6 million in ordinary capital resources
and 1146*3 million in the special fund* In 1963, these
amounts were raised to I 1,813*6 million and £219*5 million,
respectively* This substantial amount of capital allows the
bank to borrow additional funds in the world *s capital
markets* The United States also raised the Social Progress
Trust "and, which was nearly depleted, from $394 million to
$525 million. 6
From its first loan in February, 1961, until the end
of 1963, the Bank authorized $S75*1 million in loans. Of
Inter-American Development Bank, Fourth Amwju Report .













this amount, $335.8 million was from ordinary capital re-
sources, $121.7 million from the Fund for Special Operations,
and $367.6 million from the Social Progress Trust Fund*
Slightly leas than half of the $507.5 million of the Bank's
own resources has been authorised for projects in the
private sector, a considerable portion in the form of s
7
to national development institutions for relending.
One of the important activities of the IDB is pro-
viding technical assistance* Through 1963, over $23,000,000
had been authorised for technical assistance operations* A
substantial part of this amount was devoted to pre-invest-
ment and general planning studies, the formulation of
projects, and the preparation of studies of multi-national
interest as well as the creation, or reorganising and
strengthening, of agencies active in social development
fields and in mobilising resources, and the training of
professional personnel in various areas of economic and
social development. This basic, prerequisite type of tech-
nical assistance helps smooth the way for other development
assistance from various sources* More than one thousand
Latin American officials connected with development work
received training under the technical assistance programs of
the IDE during its first three years.
7Inter-American Development Dank, Activities 1961-



















ite obviously, the principal activity of the bank
is making loans* As noted earlier, there are three differ-
ent sources of IDE loans with sane overlap in function*
Agric. ' ural development has received the largest proportion
of loan funds* These loans have been made for mechanisation
programs and expansion of agricultural and livestock produc-
tion, irrigation and improved land use projects, and for
land settlement programs* Over $24 5, 000, 000 has been com-
mitted to the agricultural sector for projects costing over
$700,000,000.
Industry and mining received the next largest share
of loan funds, nearly $200,000,000* These loans have been
in the form of direct loans to both public and private enter-
prises and lines of credit to development agencies for re-
lending . A great variety of industrial activities have
benefited from these loans* The total cost of the projects
partially financed by these loans is about $600,000,000*
Infrastructure projects, water supply and sanitation,
housing and education projects and programs also have re-
ceived substantial amounts of loan funds from the IOB* The
Bank also has been active in attempting to promote outside
participation in the financing of development plans* The
Bank* s representatives work with the Development Assistance
8IDB, Fourth Annual Report , op * cit • , p* 4.
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Committee of the OECD, the Atlantic Community Development
Group for Wtin America, and various countries and groups to
attempt to mobilize financing for national development plans*
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the IDB is an inte-
gral part of the Alliance, an important cog in the machinery
of Latin American development.
III. THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank, or International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD), and its affiliates, the Inter-
national ilnance Corporation (IPC) and the International
Development Association, are active in development financing
in Latin America. The IBRD has been engaged in operations
in Latin America since 1948, the IFC since 1957, and the IDA
since 1961. They are specialized agencies of the United
Nations; but, because of their autonomous operation and par-
ticular significance fOL conomic development, they are dis-
cussed separately herein.
The IBRD has provided most of its Latin American loans
for the development of electric power and improved transpor-
tation. The agricultural, industrial, and communications
sectors also have received some loans from the bank. More
than $2,059,000,000 have been authorized in 136 loans in
Latin America up to June 30, 1964.










The IBRD has also contributed a significant amount of
technical assistance. Engineers and financial experts regu-
larly visit participating countries investigating existing
projcc and providing valuable assistance on new proposals*
Special missions have been sent to a number of countries to
make studies of specific economic sectors, geographic areas,
or particular problems or to conduct broad economic surveys
as was first done in Colombia in 1949 to form a basis for
the national development plan of that country, Staff mem-
bers have been stationed in several countries as resident
representatives to advise the government and assist in the
preparation and execution of development plans and policies*
Technical assistance is also offered in cooperation with
other agencies, such as the United Nations Special Fund and
the ^ood and Agriculture organization. The Bank helps train
personnel and conducts the Economic Development Institute in
Washington to provide economic management training for
senior officials from less-developed countries*
The International Development Association began
operations in late 1960 to provide loans to less-developed
countries on terms less burdensome for their struggling
^iantteenth Annual Report (Washington, 1963); and early par-
tial report, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, "Facts About the World Bank and the Inter-






economies. Ten credits, totaling S81.95 million* have been
extended to Latin American states by IDA, almost all for
highway development programs- These development credits
have been granted interest-free for fifty years with an
initial ten-year grace period. There is a three-fourths of
one per cent service charge on the amount actually withdrawn
and outstanding. Such favorable terms make these credits
highly advantageous for the recipients, an important supple-
ment to the more conventional loans received from other
sources. The liberal terms ease the debt-servicing problem
and help protect the future foreign exchange position of the
borrowing states.
The International Finance Corporation promotes indus-
trial development through investments in productive private
enterprises, IPC can invest in shares of capital stock,
make loans with profit-sharing or other equity features, or
underwrite new issues of shares. It also can finance the
operations of privately-owned industrial development corpora-
tions, usually called Financieras , which relend to local
industry. Up to June 30, 1964, the IFC made commitments of
over £66,000,000 in Latin America, mostly in the larger,
more industrialised countries.
International Development Association, Annual Report
1962-1963 (Washington, 1963); and supplementary IBRD, "Facts
• , • Association , * • op , cit
,
International Finance Corporation, Seventh Annual
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The World Bank Group, thus, provides development
assistance which helps promote the economic success of the
Alliance for Progress* Both in fiscal 1962 and 1964, the
group authorized over $400,000,000 in credits to Latin
America. This is a very significant percentage of the total
outside assistance envisioned by the architects of the Alli-
ance. The IBRD also organized a consultative group to help
finance the Development Plan of Colombia, the latest and one
of the most striking of a long list of achievements in the
close cooperation between the bank and this enterprising
country* As Under Secretary George Ball has stated:
The Bank's contribution has transcended the mere ex-
tension of credits; its leadership has served to give
direction to the total effort, both bilateral and
multilateral* It has devised mechanisms to encourage
the coordination of assistance* It has been a coun-
selor and friend to new nations and has lent its good
offices to the reconciliation of disputes among them* 12
IV* TH£ UMITSD RATIONS
In addition to the World Bank Group, the United
Nations Organization contributes to the Alliance in many
ways* Perhaps the most important contributions thus far
have come from the Economic Commission for Latin America
Report . 1962-1963 (Washington, 1963); and IFC, "Facts About
iFC," as of June 30, 1964 (Washington, 1964).
i20epartment of State Bulletin, XLVTI (October 15,
1962), p. 576.
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(ECLA). This organ of the UN Economic and Social Council
has long been at the Intellectual forefront In development
planning. ECLA helped mold opinion In Latin America toward
a consensus which emerged In the Act of Bogota and the
charter of the Alliance.
Since the 1961 Punta del Este meeting, SCLA has co-
operated much more closely with the CAS and the IOB. SCLA's
primary functions are basic economic research and Improved
planning methods and techniques. From 1962 through early
1964, world trade policy was a major concern. Economic
Integration Is now receiving considerable attention.
In addition, SCLA provides technical assistance, In-
formation and advisory services and, In cooperation with
other agencies, participates In various programs and task
forces to Improve economic development and trade policy.
The Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning
In Santiago was founded by SCLA to provide training for
government officials In the planning field. Here again,
SCLA Is providing a service In direct support of some of the
goals of the Alliance.
The International Monetary Fund Is a specialized
agency of the United Nations which contributes to the Alli-
ance In its distinctive way. The resources of the Fund are
not used for development purposes, but the drawings and
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problems and can thereby assist in maintaining necessary
import levels of capital goods required for development* In
addition, the IMF is able to exert some influence on borrow-
ing governments to take fiscal and monetary measures neces-
sary to correct the conditions causing chronic balance of
payments deficits* The pressure brought to bear by the Fund
may not always be effective, but it is another case of an
international lever working to accomplish goals des-red by
the united Jtates and included in the Alliance* All Alli-
ance members are IKF members, and almost all have taken
advantage of rund drawings*
A number of other organs and agencies of the UN par-
ticipate in activities in direct or indirect support of
Alliance objectives* The UN Special Fund, the World Health
Organisation, and the Food and Agriculture Organization sup-
port or conduct activities which directly contribute to the
success of the Alliance* Often these activities are in con-
junction with OAS activities or £CLA* The UN Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International
Children* s emergency Fund, and the International Labor
Organization also provide valuable assistance* Technical
assistance provided by United Nations agencies plays an
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V. 0TH3R GROUPS
Several other international groups also participate
in one way or another* The Development Assistance Committee
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
and the Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin
America (ADSLA) are two which may turn out to be among the
most important. Viewing all of these organization, one can
see how multilateral programs can and do contribute to eco-
nomic and social development and reforms* Accepting the
premise that accelerated economic development in Latin
America is advantageous in the long run for the United
States, one can afford to ignore the loss of short-term
advantages forfeited by not having direct purse-string
leverage, taking the long-range view of the benefits of
having stronger, more affluent neighbors* Multilateral
organizations furnish mutual commitments to accepted goals
and a working relationship and interchange of ideas that may
be very much lacking in bilateral relations* Representa-
tives of international organizations are more likely to be
accepted in the decision-making consultations of a member
government than the representative of the United States
would be* Difficult decisions need not be ignored because
of the fear of damaging bilateral relations* Widespread
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identification with the objectives and activities in ques-
tion.
Programs which induce changes raise touchy political
problems. There is consequently a strong case for
multilateral management of such programs in the whole
field of technical aid and investment loans for eco-
nomic development. 13
In the case of the Alliance for Progress, the multilateral
aspects form a part, but a very important part, in its
chances for success.
"The Operational Aspect of United States Foreign
Policy, in United States Congress, Senate, United States
foreign Policy , Sexim Doc. Mo. 24, 87t» Cong., 1st Sess.




SOME RESULTS IN LATIN AMERICA
The methods, the organisation, and the programs of
the Alliance have been shown. Now it is time to survey some
of the accomplishments* At the second annual review of the
Alliance in October and November, 1963, the Inter-- erican
Economic and Social Council concluded that "member countries
have achieved positive gains H in the second year of the
Alliance. The final report of the Council concentrated
upon things that needed to be done, not things that had al-
ready been accomplished* This is hardly surprising, con-
sidering the enormity of the task and the fact that it is a
ten-year program. Early gains are nevertheless important,
and an attempt will be made to review some of them.
I. CHILE
alle, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil are four of
the Alliance countries that deserve attention. Chile has
the second highest p&c capita national product in Latin
America, a high literacy rate, and a very industrious popula-
tion. The Ten-Year National Development Program, which was
Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Final
Report of the Second Annual Meeting , at the Ministerial
Level in Sao Paulo, Brazil, November, 1963 (Washington; Pan
American Union, 1963), p. 78.
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undertaken in 1961, is progressing satisfactorily. Tax re-
form was one of the first measures taken to spur development
and social progress. Tax collection and administration is
being improved with the help of Internal Revenue Service
advisers from the United States. Domestic savings and in-
vestment and the stability of the currency are problems
which are still receiving attention. Industrial develop-
it, although substantial, has not been as great as had
hoped. Low cost housing is being built at a rapid rate
in accordance with the development program, and the new
savings and loan association program is proving to be very
successful. Land reform is progressing slowly. The bene-
fits of progress are slow in reaching the vast majority of
Chileans, and inflation is a perennial problem*
Chile presents a challenge to American foreign policy
because of the possibility of a pro-communist government *s
coming to power in the September, 1964, elections. Alliance
aid is one of the major tools of the United States policy in
attempting to prevent this highly undesirable eventuality.
Thus, Chile represents a real test for foreign aid diplomacy
and the Alliance for Progress. The recent rupture of rela-
tions with Cuba represents a victory for United States







Under the dynamic leadership of Or. Alberto Lleras
Camargo, Colombia was a leader in planning, enacting legis-
lation, and obtaining financing for economic and social
development. Guillermo Valencia has succeeded Lleras as
president, but the National Front government, which has the
support of both major parties, retains its ability to pass
strong legislation and impose stringent controls on the
economy. The government has included the leaders of the
business community and organized labor and other private
sector groups as participants in the planning process*
extensive changes have been made in the structure and
administration of the tax system. Widespread measures have
been taken to promote savings, investments, and industrial
growth. Agrarian development plans include provisions for
increased credit, incorporation of technological advances,
and better transportation and marketing facilities, as well
as land reform. Extensive highway and railroad improvements
and the increase in electric power output benefit large seg-
ments of the populace. Housing construction has increased
dramatically; low cost public housing starts rose to nearly
232,000 units in 1963. Private housing construction also is
increasing rapidly.
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The private sector plays a major role in Colombian
development* The Coffee Growers Federation, the National
Association of Industrialists, and other groups play an
active role in development activities* In early 1963, a
Private Investment Jund was created to provide an additional
credit source for small and medium-size enterprises, and
there are five major financieras helping to provide capital
for private ventures*
The military forces in Colombia also contribute a
significant amount of support to development efforts; the
Air Force even provides airline services for settlers in
remote areas* The extensive civic action program is helping
to reduce the terrorist activities which have plagued the
country since 1943 and to encourage more widespread partici-
pation in development activities among the rural population*
III. VENEZUELA
Venezuela has also had the advantage of strong demo-
cratic leadership* rormer President Romulo Betancourt
brought his country to the forefront of developing nations*
Well over two billion dollars per year in oil exports is
another big advantage which Venezuela enjoys* Stable
Trust *'und ; Third Annual Report , 19G: (Washington, 1964),
p. 198.






government and a stable economy are encouraging investment*
The government has established the Venezuela Development
Corporation, the Development Financing Corporation, and the
Fund for Stabilization of Mortage Bonds which are promoting
private enterprise* Excellent highways have been built and
4
electrical power output has doubled since 1958* Agrarian
reform has been very extensively carried out* Nearly sixty
thousand families have h^on. resettled on farms} rrigation,
power plants, roads and storage facilities are being built,
and a farm mechanization program is being carried out* In
addition, credit is being made available; and schools,
hospitals, water supply and sewerage systems are being built
in a rural community development program* The army has
played an important role in the development process, pri-
marily by keeping the Communist violence in check* /hen Dr*
Raul Leoni succeeded Betancourt as President, Ted Szulc
wrote 2
President Leoni 's inauguration was a spectacular vic-
tory not only for Venezuelan and latin-American
democracy but also for the Alliance for Progress as
a broad political and philosophical concept* This
was so because the survival of Venezuelan democracy
despite the conspiracies by Communists and, earlier,
by the extreme right, resulted primarily from the
practice of progressive economic and social policies
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that were advanced hand and hand with the maintenance
of political liberties. 5
IV. BRAZIL
Brazil has presented an interesting contrast. Politi-
cal and economic conditions became so chaotic under Presi-
dent Joeo Goulart that the net influx of foreign private
capital was practically eliminated! the «forld Bank:, the IMF,
and the -ocport-Import Bank declined to make new assistance
available and economic growth slowed to a virtual standstill.
The efforts of the United States Government and the World
Bank Group to force the Brazilian government to take effec-
tive fiscal and monetary stabilization measures were unsuc-
cessful.
The largest and one of the most important of the
latin American Alliance members, the "Sleeping Giant" could
not be ignored. AID programs continued throughout the
period of Goulart's rule, although at a rate inconsistent
with the needs of Brazil. The American policy appears to
have been successful because that leftist regime, which may
have been dangerously close to communism, was removed from
the keystone country of South America in April, 1964.
The ac ions of the government of General Humberto
Castello Branco have not all been completely beyond criticism,




but the political and economic principles and general policy
of the new government appear to be oriented toward the United
States* The plans for stabilisation and development pre-
sented by Minister of Economic Planning Roberto de Qllveira
Campos will, if successfully implemented, slow inflation and
provide an economic climate more conducive to external
financing and accelerated growth*
V. FUWCTIQHAL AREAS
Although it is easy to slip into generalities, in
some ways one can measure material accomplishments more
readily by monitoring the progress in various functional
areas rather than looking at overall progress in individual
nations* Some of the basic areas of reform and development
to which attention has l^^n directed under the Alliance will
be discussed now, and an attempt made to evaluate the prog-
ress that has been made*
New agrarian reform legislation has been enacted by
more than half of the governments of Alliance members* Al-
though these legislative battles have bta^n won, numerous and
complex problems remain in the way of implementation before
the full benefits of these reforms can be realised* Most of
the rest of the Latin American governments have, at least,
drawn up proposals for land reform and improved agricultural
development* Although concrete results have been slow in
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manifest ing themselves, perhaps an a11-important benefit has
already been achieved—that is, the break with tradition and
the move toward new solutions to age-old problems. In the
spring of 1964, an estimated 25,000,000 acres had been dis-
tributed through reform programs since the start of the
Alliance.
Tax reform is another basic measure which must be
undertaken in order to achieve the desired social reforms.
Maw legislation has been enacted in more than half of the
amber countries to provide increased resources for develop*
ment and upremd the tax burden more equitably. More effi-
cient collection procedures and enforcement measures have
also been important considerations. Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru, and Venezuela have substantially improved their sys-
tems since 1961.
Extensive housing programs have been launched* Every
country, except Haiti, has formed national housing agencies
and prepared national housing programs. The new low-cost
housing programs not only help to ease social tensions but
also provide a boost to the economy by increasing employment
and stimulating the construction industry and related busi-
ness wtiterpri%esm Self-help programs alone which have
already been approved for financing under the Alliance will
Alliance for Progress Information Team, Press Re-















result in over 220,000 new homes for 1,500,000 people,
Chile has programmed 15,000 new units annually, and Colombia
28,000 annually, increasing to 30,000 in 1967. Important
strides have also been made in making credit available for
housing, such as the increase of savings and loan institu-
tions •
Health and education programs have advanced rapidly.
Among the many health efforts, water and sewerage systems are
being built which will benefit eighteen million people.
Vaccination programs, new hospitals and mobile medical facili-
ties, and many other public health activities are in progress.
Twelve million Latin American children are being fed under
9
various Food for Peace Programs. More than eight thousand
new classrooms were built and nearly four million textbooks
produced during the first two years of the Alliance. Ex-
tensive efforts have been made to improve education and train-
ing facilities and to make them available to increasing
numbers of students. The development of human resources is
recognized as one of the most important aspects of the Alli-
ance.
7U.S. Agency for International Development, Proposed
Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs FY 1965 (Washington,
I$<54>, p. 4$.
8Ibid. 9Ibid .
U.S. Agency for International Development, U,.jS«
Assistance to Latin America , Obligations and Loan Authoriza-
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port volume and income have increased, power and
transportation facilities are expanding, and domestic indus-
tries are showing increasing signs of life. Although a
great deal remains to be done, Teodoro Koscoso has written
that:
The progress achieved during the two years since the
Charter was signed shows more action by the Latin
Americans in the enactment of basic reforms than in
the preceding half-century.*1
Teodoro Moscoso, ''Two Years of the Alliance,"
International Commerce, LXIX (November 4, 1963), p. 3.
1
CHAPTER IX
THE NINTH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
The summer of 1964 brought a test of the political
effectiveness of American policy in the hemisphere* The
Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, serving as Organ of Consultation in application of
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was held
in Washington from July 21 to 26* This meeting provided an
opportunity to mobilize support for meaningful action
against Castro-Cuba*
The Government of Venezuela had requested that the
Council of the CAS convoke the Organ of Consultation to con-
sider measures to be taken against the Government of Cuba
for acts of aggression and intervention in Venezuela* In
December, 1963, the Council, acting provisionally, appointed
a committee to investigate the charges and convoked the
Organ of Consultation to meet at an unspecified future date,
later set at July 21*
The investigating committee found that the Cuban
government had conducted a hostile and systematic propaganda
campaign against the Betancourt government and had incited
and supported subversion in Venezuela* Not only were funds
and training provided from Cuba, but arms and ammunition as
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veil* An arms cache discovered on November 1, 1963, fvar-
nished concrete evidence of Cuban involvement.
Previous attempts by the United States and some of
the Caribbean countries to move the CAS to take effective
sanctions against Castro had met stiff opposition and re-
sulted in watered-down resolutions and the "exclusion"
compromise of 1962* The protracted delay in scheduling this
Foreign Ministers* meeting indicated some possibility that a
decision was being avoided, tending to raise the inference
that sanctions were not feasible under the then-current
climate of opinion among the CAS membership* However, im-
portant changes In South America made the task of arriving
at a consensus for action somewhat less difficult in 1964*
Argentina and Brazil no longer remained aligned with Mexico
in a powerful opposition bloc* A new government in Ecuador
also brought a changed viewpoint from Quito* Thus, three of
the six members who voted against the exclusion of the Castro
regime from CAS activities at Punta del Este in 1962 no
longer felt constrained to obstruct action against the
Havana government* Although unanimity was still patently
impossible, the strength of the opposition had been reduced
considerably*
Secretary Rusk's address to the Ministers on July 22
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similarity to the resolutions which were later adopted*
The period of nearly eight months which had elapsed since
the CAS Council first started the proceedings against Cuba
had apparently been utilized effectively by the United
States and the other supporters of a hard line against Cuba.
I. RS30LUTI0WS
The Foreign Ministers adopted six resolutions, the
first of which is directly quoted below:
1. To declare that the acts verified by the Investi-
gating Committee constitute an aggression and an
intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba in
the Internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all
of the member states.
2. To condemn emphatically the present Government of
Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention
against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty,
and the political independence of Venezuela*
3* To apply, in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures:
a* That the governments of the American states
not maintain diplomatic or consular relations
with the Government of Cuba;
b* That the governments of the American states
suspend all their trade, whether direct or
indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs,
medicines and medical equipment that may be
sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and
c* That the governments of the American states
suspend all sea transportation between their
State Department Bulletin. LI (August 10, 1964),
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countries and Cuba, except for such trans-
portation as may be necessary for reasons of
a humanitarian nature*
4. To authorise the Council of the Organization of
American States, by an affirmative vote of two thirds
of its members, to discontinue the measures adopted
in the present resolution at such time as the Govern-
ment of Cuba shall have ceased to constitute a danger
to the peace and security of the hemisphere*
5* To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should
persist in carrying out acts that possess character-
istics of aggression and intervention against one or
more of the member states of the Organization, the
member states shall pr^s^rv their essential rights
as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in
either individual or collective form, which could go
so far as resort to armed force, until such time as
the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee
the peace and security of the hemisphere*
6* To urge those states not members of the Organi-
zation of American States that are animated by the
same Ideals as the inter-American system to examine
the possibility of effectively demonstrating their
*wildarity in achieving the purposes of this resolu-
tion*
7* To instruct the Secretary General of the Organi-
zation of American States to transmit to the United
Nations Security Council the text of the present
resolution, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 54 of the United Nations Charter* 2
This resolution was adopted by a vote of 15-4,
livia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay voting against it*
A Declaration to the People of Cuba was adopted which
expressed the hope that the Cubans might be able to "liberate
themselves from the tyranny of the Communist regime that
2Pan American Union, Pinal Act, Ninth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ( Washington
,
1964;, pp. 5 and 6*
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oppresses then" end which elso extolled the ideas of human
rights, liberty, and representative democracy. This resolu-
tion was adopted without a negative vote—Uruguay joining
the majority, while Brazil, Chile, and Mexico abstained*
Cven more popular in the voting, a resolution to work toward
regional and international economic coordination and other
economic development goals was adopted unanimously, as was a
resolution to transmit to the GAS Council Argentina's pro-
posal concerning diplomatic relations among the member states,
II. IKTERPRETIHG THE RESULTS
As the meeting closed, it could be considered a
qualified success. At last, the Castro government had been
tried w^d convicted, so to speak, by the inter-American
group charged with the multilateral maintenance of security
in the hemisphere. More than the required two thirds of the
member states agreed that the acts of the Cuban government
constituted "an aggression and an intervention," and voted
to impose sanctions. This in itself was an important vic-
tory. Also noteworthy was the fact that the majority con-
sidered unnecessary the expediency of making the sanctions
voluntary through a recommendatory resolution or other
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Argentina and Brazil, undoubtedly, helped make unnecessary a
concession of this sort*
Perhaps some critics may point out that this major
shift in strength might be related to the internal political
positions of conservative military elements in Argentina and
Brazil* This certainly is a factor} however, comparisons
with the former days of Trujillo, Perez Jimenez, and Anas-
taslo Somoza hardly seem fair* This is a continuing problem
for the United States because the more conservative Latin
American governments appear to be more friendly toward
United States policies and methods than the more leftist
governments* This problem is larger than the Alliance, yet
intrinsic to it* At the present time, military-oriented
governments and undemocratleally-constituted regimes are not
only tolerated but sometimes looked upon rather favorably as
long as promises of frm^ elections or other trappings of
democracy are offered*
The fact that the four dissenters voted negatively
rather than abstaining perhaps indicated the firmness of
their opposition* This qualified the extent of the United
States victory because of the possibility of non-compliance
with mandatory sanctions by four members* Such an eventu-
ality would have a highly corrosive effect on the QAS and
the Rio Treaty*








designed to placate leftist and anti-Yankee political ele-
ments at home, but that the sanctions would later be invoked
at a more propitious time, such as after elections or changes
of government* However, the Government of Chile did not
wait long, President Jorge Alessandri declaring within a
month of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting that "the resolution
against Cuba has to be complied with. If not, it would
imply a serious precedent and mean sooner or later the with-
4drawal of Chile from the inter-American system. M Bolivia
and Uruguay later followed suit, but the new government of
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz in Mexico has shown no more inclination
to sever relations with Cuba than the Lopez Kateos govern-
ment which voted against the sanctions.
The Mexican refusal to carry out the sanctions voted
by the Foreign Ministers sets a very dangerous precedent in
the CAS. The fact that none of the other nations chose to
disregard the mandate of the Organ of Consultation helps
make the current situation fairly harmonious, but it does
not alter the fact of a very unfortunate precedent. The Rio
Treaty pr tects the sovereignty of the member states by
excepting the use of armed force without the consent of each
government, but all other sanctions are binding on all
4Tlme LXXXIV (August 21, 1964), p. 27.









members. Thus, Mexico has violated Article 20, meanwhile
protesting that Rio Treaty sanctions do not apply to "situa-
tions of the kind and nature dealt with by this Meeting of
Consultation* n Since effective action will always depend
on the support of the individual governments, this defection
by Mexico does not presage the collapse of the inter-
American security system, but it is an unfortunate decision
which may hamper the operation of the systea in the future,
and it prevents Cuba from being isolated from the rest of
the hemisphere in the present*
Despite these considerations, this Meeting of Consul-
tation must be considered a success for the American policy*
A great majority of the Latin American governments offi-
cially recognized the dangers presented by a Communist
government in the hemisphere and by Castro—Cuba* s activities
in particular* Not only have these dangers been recognized,
but this time action was taken, sanctions were imposed*
A conclusion that the Alliance for Progress was the
principal cause of this American victory would be rather
difficult to document* However, the Alliance has been the
dominant ingredient of hemisphere relations since mid—1961
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ,
Article "ZET.
Pan American Union, op* cit
•
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and, therefore, it must be assigned some causal relation-
ship* One might well speculate on the actions of Bolivia
and Chile had there been no Alliance* Can a relationship be
established between the Alliance and the overthrow of
Goularti The "pork barrel" and "logrolling" are political
techniques that work rather well at home ?xe they now being
used effectively in international affairs. Perhaps it is
more accurate as well as more fashionable to say that rather
we are building a consensus against communism in the hemi-
sphere* However it is enunciated, our policy depends upon a
large outlay of government funds for foreign aid* The Alli-
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Throughout this thesis, many questions have been
asked and some of them have been answered* One very basic,
underlying question which remains partially unanswered is
whether foreign aid is actually a reliable, effective instru-
ment of foreign policy, capable of contributing to the
security of the United States* An attempt has been made to
show an affirmative relationship, but the Alliance itself
will furnish the best answer sometime in the future*
For the pr^mmtt t the problems of Latin America have
been analysed and related to the national interest of the
United States* Five types of threat to United States
security have been postulated, and one Bm^s that the Alli-
ance provides support for meeting each type* The solidarity
and improved relations encouraged by the Alliance are useful
in uniting the hemisphere to resist outside aggression*
This solidarity and rapport, plus the economic interdepend-
ence fostered by the Alliance, offer a deterrent to border
wars or other forms of overt aggression within the hemi-
sphere*
The goals of economic and social progress of the
Alliance are even more directly related to preventing the
domestic unrest and violent indigenous revolutions which
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were Identified as the third type of threat end communist-
inspired subversion and revolution, which was the fourth
type* Finally, the whole concept of the Alliance is de-
signed to promote friendly relations with all democratic
elements of all Latin American countries and thus, in effect,
to avoid the fifth form of threat-—unfriendly Latin American
governments* The United States certainly hopes to prevent
actual or potential enemies from establishing any more
military bases in this hemisphere*
The Alliance directly contributes toward our long-
range goal of independent, self-supporting Latin American
nations* Another objective is that the development process
takes place under frme institutions, which is somewhat of a
problem in some cases* Stable governments are not guar-
anteed, although they are hoped for, since they offer some
continuity and order in development planning and implementa-
tion* United States military assistance programs may help
to promote a certain stability in some member governments*
The tremendous increase in communication and empha-
sis on increased trade should Bm^re to increase the possi-
bilities I or keeping open trade routes and profitable trade
relations despite some import substitution and other at-
tempts by the Latin Americans to arrive at a more favorable
trade balance*
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military alliances, it does not prevent them. The friendly
relations which hopefully result may very well encourage
Latin American governments to grant overflight and landing
rights and perhaps bases for United States military forces
in the event of war.
One can see that the Alliance is designed to help
promote United States objectives and to meet the possible
security threats in Latin America. At the root of the
matter is the social injustice and economic underdevelopment
of the area. So much space has already been devoted to
these problems and how the Alliance is attempting to solve
?m that here it is necessary only to state that these
problems are recognised and they are being attacked under
the Alliance* Their solution is a very long-range project.
There can be no question of the effectiveness of the Alli-
ance in facing these problems, only in solving them*
Mot only does the Alliance face a string of annuax
appropriations fights in the United States Congress, but it
must pass continual tests among the peoples as well as the
governments of the Latin American nations* Many difficult
decision » must be made, and often the unpleasant choice is
the only one that will produce success* The voluntary re-
linquishing of privileges and benefits long considered
appropriate to one's hereditary position does not come
easily* Hew financial burdens are not eagerly accepted by






the old aristocracy or by the struggling middle and lower
sectors* The effectiveness of the Alliance rests, to a
great extent, on the outcome of these domestic struggles in
the several member states.
The Alliance cannot be isolated from other foreign
policy considerations* In the often violent, frequently
unscheduled changes of government in Latin America, the
United states usually becomes a party, even if it is only a
matter of the timeliness of recognition of the new govern-
ment* The actual or alleged meddling by the United States
in the internal political problems of Latin American nations
continues to present problems* In these areas, some short**
term measures taken by the Ui I States may be necessary
and effective, but, at other times, the multilateral ap-
proach can be better employed. Unilaterally withholding aid
funds, nonx ©cognition, and measures of this type are some*
what extrinsic to the Alliance, but collectively imposing
preconditions for receiving Alliance funds is not. Politi-
cal problems have a very direct bearing on the operation of
the Alliance as well as on its chances for success*
Political problems lead us naturally to the Organisa-
tion of American States* The Alliance is, to some extent,
an attempt to keep the QA5 viable* There is a definite
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to achieve an order of peace and justice to promote
their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration
and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial
integrity and their independence. 1
In order to continue to forego unilateral action in Latin
America, the United States oust be able to rely on the OAS
to maintain some semblance of law and order In the hemi-
The principles of the OAS are unassailable, but dif-
fering interpretations of the Charter, the Rio Treaty, and
the degree of the threat of communism have left the Organi-
sation little ability to act against Communist regimes* The
Alliance strengthens the OAS by injecting new enthusiasm
into the organisation, increasing its size and capabilities,
and providing an opportunity for achieving some of the
camaraderie that comes from winning joint victories* The
Alliance also is a tool of American foreign policy which can
be used to persuade or coerce the governments of the hemi-
sphere to take certain actions or positions—whether inside
or outside of the OAS* Finally, the Alliance is a form of
what has been called "the strategy of the third choice, H
helping the transitional societies find an evolutionary path









to modernisation without repressive frustration or dicta-
2
tori&l and revolutionary means*
The moral, humanitarian values and long-range advan-
tages of assisting the Latin American nations to a new level
of economic growth and social justice are factors to con-
sider* However, the immediate and long-term interests of
the United States must take priority. President Kenned*
said:
We have seen very recently . . • how difficult it is
to eject a Communist regime once it gets its police
power and controls the country* The best way, the
cheapest way, the safest way, the most reliable way,
is to help them help themselves maintain their free-
C1AP meeh nr Walt Rostow recently «aid that "among a very
wide range of leadership in Latin American life there is an
active commitment to go forward rather than to dig in on the
4basis of the status quo*" This acceptance of the need for
change by the leadership is one of the first and most im-
portant prerequisites for the success of the Alliance* The
appointment of Rostow to the CIAP tends to indicate that the
Lted States Congress, Senate, "Sconomlc, Social
and Political Change in the underdeveloped Countries and
its Implications for United States Policy,** United States
Foreign Policy , Sen* Doc* Mo. 24, 87m Cong*, 1st Sess.
(Washington x Government Printing Office, 1961), p* 1173*
3John F. Kennedy, "Television Remarks, M Department
of State Bulletin . XLVII (October 8, 1962), p. 525*
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Johnson administration Is interested in making the Alliance
a success*
The fear of aggression from outside the hemisphere
has always been the most powerful binding force in the
Americas* Mow that this fear is not strong enough to be the
controlling factor, the other principles which have histori-
cally been a part of an inter-American consensus must o
made into the binding force* President Kennedy recognised
this fact* The Alliance for Progress is a means to that
end* It la not a mere attempt to purchase inter-American
solidarity, but a method through which the Americas can be
reunited in support of those moral and juridical principles
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